New Jersey Institute of Technology

Digital Commons @ NJIT
Dissertations

Electronic Theses and Dissertations

Summer 8-31-2011

Security systems based on Gaussian integers : Analysis of basic
operations and time complexity of secret transformations
Aleksey Koval
New Jersey Institute of Technology

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations
Part of the Computer Sciences Commons

Recommended Citation
Koval, Aleksey, "Security systems based on Gaussian integers : Analysis of basic operations and time
complexity of secret transformations" (2011). Dissertations. 277.
https://digitalcommons.njit.edu/dissertations/277

This Dissertation is brought to you for free and open access by the Electronic Theses and Dissertations at Digital
Commons @ NJIT. It has been accepted for inclusion in Dissertations by an authorized administrator of Digital
Commons @ NJIT. For more information, please contact digitalcommons@njit.edu.

Copyright Warning & Restrictions
The copyright law of the United States (Title 17, United
States Code) governs the making of photocopies or other
reproductions of copyrighted material.
Under certain conditions specified in the law, libraries and
archives are authorized to furnish a photocopy or other
reproduction. One of these specified conditions is that the
photocopy or reproduction is not to be “used for any
purpose other than private study, scholarship, or research.”
If a, user makes a request for, or later uses, a photocopy or
reproduction for purposes in excess of “fair use” that user
may be liable for copyright infringement,
This institution reserves the right to refuse to accept a
copying order if, in its judgment, fulfillment of the order
would involve violation of copyright law.
Please Note: The author retains the copyright while the
New Jersey Institute of Technology reserves the right to
distribute this thesis or dissertation
Printing note: If you do not wish to print this page, then select
“Pages from: first page # to: last page #” on the print dialog screen

The Van Houten library has removed some of the
personal information and all signatures from the
approval page and biographical sketches of theses
and dissertations in order to protect the identity of
NJIT graduates and faculty.

ABSTRACT
SECURITY SYSTEMS BASED ON GAUSSIAN INTEGERS: ANALYSIS OF
BASIC OPERATIONS AND TIME COMPLEXITY OF SECRET
TRANSFORMATIONS

by
Aleksey Koval
Many security algorithms currently in use rely heavily on integer arithmetic modulo
prime numbers. Gaussian integers can be used with most security algorithms that are
formulated for real integers. The aim of this work is to study the benefits of common
security protocols with Gaussian integers. Although the main contribution of this work is
to analyze and improve the application of Gaussian integers for various public key (PK)
algorithms, Gaussian integers were studied in the context of image watermarking as well.
The significant benefits of the application of Gaussian integers become apparent
when they are used with Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) based PK algorithms. In
order to quantify the complexity of the Gaussian integer DLP, it is reduced to two other
well known problems: DLP for Lucas sequences and the real integer DLP. Additionally,
a novel exponentiation algorithm for Gaussian integers, called Lucas sequence
Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG) is introduced and its performance assessed,
both analytically and experimentally. The LSEG achieves about 35% theoretical
improvement in CPU time over real integer exponentiation. Under an implementation
with the GMP 5.0.1 library, it outperformed the GMP’s "mpz_powm" function (the
particularly efficient modular exponentiation function that comes with the GMP library)
by 40% for bit sizes 1000-4000, because of low overhead associated with LSEG. Further
improvements to real execution time can be easily achieved on multiprocessor or

multicore platforms. In fact, over 50% improvement is achieved with a parallelized
implementation of LSEG. All the mentioned improvements do not require any special
hardware or software and are easy to implement. Furthermore, an efficient way for
finding generators for DLP based PK algorithms with Gaussian integers is presented.
In addition to DLP based PK algorithms, applications of Gaussian integers for
factoring-based PK cryptosystems are considered. Unfortunately, the advantages of
Gaussian integers for these algorithms are not as clear because the extended order of
Gaussian integers does not directly come into play. Nevertheless, this dissertation
describes the Extended Square Root algorithm for Gaussian integers used to extend the
Rabin Cryptography algorithm into the field of Gaussian integers. The extended Rabin
Cryptography algorithm with Gaussian integers allows using fewer preset bits that are
required by the algorithm to guard against various attacks. Additionally, the extension of
RSA into the domain of Gaussian integers is analyzed. The extended RSA algorithm
could add security only if breaking the original RSA is not as hard as factoring. Even in
this case, it is not clear whether the extended algorithm would increase security.
Finally, the randomness property of the Gaussian integer exponentiation is
utilized to derive a novel algorithm to rearrange the image pixels to be used for image
watermarking. The new algorithm is more efficient than the one currently used and it
provides a degree of cryptoimmunity. The proposed method can be used to enhance most
picture watermarking algorithms.
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION

The history of cryptography dates back thousands of years. Over most of this time, it has
been a history of symmetric cryptography. It appeared obvious that the only way for
several parties to communicate securely is to share a secret method or a key. It seemed
that there is no other way because the recipient must have an advantage over
eavesdropper. Key exchange is the weakest link of symmetric cryptography. The
challenge of exchanging secret keys securely is magnified when there are many parties
that need to communicate.
The revolution in cryptography happened in 1970s when Public Key or
asymmetric cryptography was introduced. In 1976, Diffie and Hellman published a
revolutionary paper titled "New Directions in Cryptography" [26], where they introduced
the concepts of Public Key or asymmetric cryptography. In addition, they introduced the
method of exchanging keys known as Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol. The
Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol relies on the difficulty of the discrete logarithm
problem. Similar techniques were invented earlier by James H. Ellis, Clifford Cocks, and
Malcolm Williamson at GCHQ but were kept secret until the late 1990s. After this, many
new Public Key algorithm and techniques were introduced. Most notable of these are
RSA, Rabin, ElGamal and Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC).
In 1977, the RSA algorithm was1invented by Rivest, Shamir and Adleman at
MIT. It relies on the difficulty of factoring large numbers, which are products of two
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large primes. RSA was a great success and currently is the most commonly used Public
Key Encryption algorithm.
In 1979, M. O. Rabin introduced a Rabin Cryptosystem, which, as RSA, is based
on the difficulty of factoring large numbers. Rabin Cryptosystem has some notable
advantages over RSA; however, it is not as widely used as RSA.
In 1984, Taher ElGamal introduced the ElGamal algorithm. As the DiffieHellman Key Exchange protocol, it is using the difficulty of the discrete logarithm
problem. As RSA, ElGamal is currently widely used.
In 1985, Neal Koblitz and Victor S. Miller introduced Elliptic Curve
Cryptography (ECC). It uses a special algebraic structure called elliptic curves over finite
group. ECC is very promising technique because the discrete logarithm problem over
elliptic curves is more difficult than the same problem over integers. This allows for
smaller keys which, in turn, increase the efficiency. ECC has been recommended by the
NSA and seem to have a very bright future.
Despite apparent advantages of Public Key cryptography, it is not about to replace
symmetric cryptography. There are many reasons to use symmetric cryptography. The
most important one is that all known Public Key algorithms are not nearly as efficient as
symmetric cryptography algorithms. For instance, asymmetric algorithms may work well
to encrypt emails because a delay of fraction of a second for email is not noticeable.
However, for real time delay sensitive applications like Voice over IP (VOIP) or Virtual
Private Networks (VPN) this kind of delay is unacceptable. The practical solution for this
is to use a Private Key algorithm to distribute a symmetric key and use the symmetric key
to encrypt and decrypt the messages. For example, the contemporary VPN protocols use
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Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol (asymmetric) to exchange Triple DES
(symmetric protocol) keys.
Efficiency of Public Key algorithms is directly tied to the size of the key. As
computing power grows, the keys have to grow also. For example, 512-bit keys for RSA
were considered sufficiently secure. At present, even 1024 bit keys are sometimes
considered potentially weak. Most companies and individuals use 2048 bit keys for RSA
now.
One of the directions of contemporary cryptography research is extending triedand-true Public Key Cryptography algorithms such as RSA, ElGamal and Rabin into
well-studied cyclical groups. The aim is to improve the security of the algorithms by
introducing more complexity. Improved security would allow for use of smaller keys, in
turn, improving efficiency. One difficulty is that with increased complexity overhead is
introduced that may undermine any efficiency improvements. Another difficulty is that as
the algorithms become more complex it becomes harder to assess their security.
In this dissertation, the use of Gaussian integers as the underlying field for RSA,
ElGamal and Rabin algorithms is studied. The extension of the Rabin algorithm into the
field of Gaussian integers is introduced.
Gaussian integers are complex numbers with integers as both real and imaginary
part. Carl Friedrich Gauss introduced the ring of Gaussian integers in 1829 – 1831. He
formulated many properties of Gaussian integers like properties of factorization and the
concept of Gaussian Prime. Gauss used them as a tool to prove some theoretical results.
The properties of Gaussian integers and Gaussian Primes are well known and formulated
so they are going to be used as facts.
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1.1

Problem Statement

Many security algorithms currently in use rely heavily on integer arithmetic modulo
prime numbers. Gaussian integers can be used with most security algorithms that are
formulated for real integers. The aim of this work is to study the benefits of common
security protocols with Gaussian integers. Although the main contribution of this work is
to analyze and improve the application of Gaussian integers for various public key (PK)
algorithms, Gaussian integers were studied in the context of image watermarking as well.
Among the most widely used PK algorithms are RSA, Diffie-Hellman key
exchange, ElGamal, and Rabin [58] PK algorithms. Unfortunately, in order to provide a
required degree of cryptoimmunity, the keys must be very large. Large keys mean lower
speed of encryption/decryption/authentication. One of the ways to increase speed is to
consider more complicated fields with larger cyclic groups, e.g., Gaussian integers. Most
mainstream PKC algorithms fall into two categories: Discrete Logarithm problem (DLP)
based (e.g., ElGamal or Diffie-Hellman key exchange) and integer factoring based (RSA
or Rabin). Gaussian integers can be successfully used with all the PK algorithms that are
formulated for real integers and this work explores the application of Gaussian integers
for both types of PK algorithms.
The Gaussian integer modulo prime cyclic group order is much larger then the
real integer modulo prime order for the same prime. However, larger order does not
guarantee increased security nor does it mean that the extended PK algorithms would be
more efficient. The security depends on the complexity of the underlying DLP.
Unfortunately, assessing complexity of such DLP is usually very hard. One way to do it
is to reduce the Gaussian integer DLP to another well known problem: DLP for Lucas
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sequences, which is about twice as hard as the real integer DLP for the same prime. This
reduction is described in Chapter 2. Another challenge was to perform the exponentiation
of Gaussian integers faster than the exponentiation of real integers. This goal was
achieved with a novel exponentiation algorithm for Gaussian integers, which called
Lucas sequence Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG). The performance of LSEG
is assesed both analytically and experimentally. The LSEG achieves about 35%
theoretical improvement in CPU time over real integer exponentiation. Under an
implementation with the GMP 5.0.1 library it outperformed the GMP’s "mpz_powm"
function (the particularly efficient modular exponentiation function that comes with the
GMP library) by 40% for bit sizes 1000-4000, because of low overhead associated with
LSEG. Further improvements to real execution time can be easily achived on
multiprocessor or multicore platforms with parallelizing certain steps in LSEG. All the
mentioned improvements do not require any special hardware or software and are easy to
implement. Additionally, an efficient way for finding generators is proposed. It would be
useful for real-world implementations of DLP based PK algorithms with Gaussian
integers.
In addition to DLP based PK algorithms, the applications of Gaussian integers for
factoring-based PK cryptosystems are considered. Unfortunately, the advantages of
Gaussian integers for these algorithms are not as clear, because the extended order of
Gaussian integers does not directly come into play. Nevertheless, the Extended Square
Root algorithm for Gaussian integers is derived and its validity is proven. Using this
algorithm, Rabin Cryptography algorithm was extended into the field of Gaussian
integers. The resulting Extended Rabin Cryptography algorithm allows using fewer
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preset bits that are required by the algorithm to guard against various attacks.
Additionally, the extension of RSA into the domain of Gaussian integers is analyzed indepth. The analysis, published in [49], yielded several interesting results, e.g., that a
certain type of Gaussian primes does not offer any advantages over real primes.
Finally, the randomness property of the Gaussian integer exponentiation is
utilized to derive a novel algorithm to rearrange the image pixels to be used for image
watermarking. Currently many image watermarking techniques use Arnold’s cat map to
rearrange the image pixels as a part of the watermarking algorithm. In the rearrangement
step, Arnold’s cat map can be replaced with the new algorithm based on Gaussian
integers, which has the advantages of increased speed and security. Moreover, the new
algorithm can provide a degree of cryptoimmunity to image watermarking. The proposed
method can be used with most picture watermarking algorithms to enhance them.
The techniques and theoretical framework developed and presented in this
dissertation offer some interesting avenues for further research. Potential uses include
new cryptography algorithms, primality testing, steganography and cryptanalysis of the
existing algorithms.

1.2

Survey of References

In 1979, M. O. Rabin in his paper “Digitalized Signatures and Public Key Functions as
Intractable as Factorization”, [58], introduced a new cryptosystem, later called the Rabin
Cryptosystem. The Rabin Cryptosystem, as the RSA, is based on the difficulty of
factoring large numbers. Rabin Cryptosystem has some notable advantages over the
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RSA, mainly faster encryption. The encryption with Rabin is very simple. If m is a
message and n=pq is a product of two large primes, then the ciphertext c is c=m2 mod n.
To decrypt the message, the reverse operation is needed, namely, the receiver has to take
a square root of c mod n. Rabin showed that the square root mod n operation is equivalent
to factoring of n. This means that the code can only be broken if the adversary can factor
n. Thus the Rabin Cryptosystem is proven as secure as factorization.
As other public key cryptosystems, the Rabin Cryptosystem can be used to
digitally sign documents. The method for signing documents using public key
cryptosystems was first described in the seminal paper by R. L. Rivest. A. Shamir, and L.
Adleman: “A Method for Obtaining Digital Signatures and Public Key Cryptosystems”,
[59], where the authors introduced the concept of digital signatures.
In 1985, W. Alexi, B. Chor, O. Goldreich and C. P. Schnorr published
“RSA/Rabin Functions: Certain Parts are As Hard As the Whole”, [4], where they prove
that, if one is able to predict the least significant bit of the number m2 mod n (Rabin) or
the me mod n (RSA) with a probability greater than ½, then it is possible to invert the
function. This result is important for algorithms that use Rabin or RSA for random
number generators.
Another notable paper on the subject of Rabin algorithm signatures security is
“Proving Tight Security for Standard Rabin-Williams Signatures”, [13], by Daniel J.
Bernstein. In this paper, the author proves that any generic attack on standard Rabin
signatures could be converted into the factorization algorithm, thus proving the security
of Rabin signatures.
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In 2001, A. N. El-Kassar, M. Rizk, N. Mirza, and Y.A. Awad, in a paper titled
“ElGamal Public-Key Cryptosystem in the Domain of Gaussian Integers” [27] introduced
an extension of the ElGamal algorithm into the field of Gaussian integers. The extension
deals with Gaussian integers modulo real Gaussian Primes (primes p : p mod 4 = 3 ). The
proposed cryptosystem is, presumably, more secure because the order of a Gaussian
Prime generator is p2-1 as opposed to p for real integers. This is potentially a huge
advantage because this allows for the use of smaller primes, which dramatically improves
the efficiency.
In 2002, H. Elkamchouchi, K. Elshenawy and H. Shaban introduced the extension
of the RSA algorithm to the field of Gaussian integers in their paper “Extended RSA
Cryptosystem and Digital Signature Schemes in the Domain of Gaussian Integers” [30].
As opposed to the ElGamal extension, the domain of Gaussian Primes is not restricted.
Consequently, the strength of this algorithm is based on Gaussian integer factoring as
opposed to real integer factoring. The security of the proposed cryptosystem was not
proven in this paper.
In 2004, A. N. El-Kassar, R. A. Haraty and Y.A. Awad in their paper "Modified
RSA in the Domains of Gaussian Integers and Polynomials Over Finite Fields” [28]
formulated the extension of RSA into the domain of Gaussian integer modulo real primes
similar to the domain in [27]. This paper describes a special case of the extended RSA
algorithm described in [30].
In 2004, Ramzi A. Haraty, A. N. El-Kassar and Hadi Otrok in their paper "A
Comparative Study of RSA based Cryptographic Algorithms” [35] tested the reliability
and security of several RSA extensions described in [28]. The authors found that all
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algorithms tested to be reliable and probably secure. The running time of Gaussian RSA
was similar to the original RSA. This paper does not prove the security of Gaussian
integer RSA.
In 2004, Ramzi A. Haraty, Hadi Otrok and A. N. El-Kassar in their paper "A
Comparative Study of ElGamal Based Cryptographic Algorithms" [36]

tested the

reliability and security of several extensions of the ElGamal algorithm. Among the
algorithms tested, was an extension of ElGamal into the field of Gaussian integers
described in [27]. To test the security the Baby-step Giant-step algorithm was used. The
authors found that the ElGamal algorithm with Gaussian integers was probably stronger
than the original, because the discrete logarithm took for Gaussian integers took twice as
long to compute. By no means is this a proof that it is strong, however, it is an indication
that it could be stronger than the original.
The paper by Ramzi A. Haraty, Hadi Otrok and A. N. El-Kassar "Attacking
ElGamal Based Cryptographic Algorithms Using Pollard's Rho Algorithm" [38] is very
similar to [36]. Here, to test the security the authors enhanced the Pollard's Rho algorithm
to work with Gaussian integers (the original Pollard's Rho algorithm works with real
integers). All the analysis and results are essentially the same as in [36].
In 2005, Boris S. Verkhovsky and A. Mutovic in their paper "Primality Testing
Algorithm Using Pythagorean Integers" [66]

introduced a novel use for Gaussian

integers, namely, primality testing. The algorithms presented improve the performance of
the Fermat’s original primality test. They are able to detect Carmichael numbers
(undetectable with the original Fermat’s test) with high probability. The primality test
introduced in [67] uses quaternions to further improve the probability of detecting
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Carmichael numbers. The theory and techniques that will be presented in this
dissertation, together with other ideas presented by Dr. Boris S. Verkhovsky, may allow
an improvement of the test introduced in [66]. The primality testing with Gaussian
integers and their variants will not be in the scope of this dissertation, but illustrates the
practical value of the topic to be explored.
The paper by Ramzi A. Haraty, A. N. El-Kassar and B. Shibaro "A Comparative
Study of RSA Based Digital Signature Algorithms" [37] is very similar to [35]. As
opposed to encryption and decryption in [35], this paper deals with extended RSA digital
signature schemes. For the most part, it is a report on experiments ran by the authors.
The paper by Peter Smith “LUC Public Key Encryption: a Secure Alternative to
RSA” [62], published in 1993, describes the first cryptosystem that is based on Lucas
sequences, called LUC. LUC uses calculation of Lucas functions as an alternative to real
integer exponentiation. The paper claims that “while Lucas functions are somewhat more
complex mathematically than exponentiation, they produce superior ciphers. “
Another paper by Peter Smith “Cryptography Without Exponentiation” [63],
published in 1994, introduced three more algorithms based on Lucas sequences: a Lucasfunction ElGamal PK encryption, a Lucas-function ElGamal digital signature, and a key
exchange algorithm called LUCDIF (essentially, LUCDIF is the Diffie-Hellman key
exchange protocol over Lucas sequences).

All three algorithms are based on the

difficulty of the Discrete Logarithm problem for Lucas functions. The author claims that
the proposed cryptosystems are stronger, because they are not based on exponentiation
and, therefore, the subexponential-time algorithms currently known cannot be used
against them.
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The paper by Chi-Sung Laih, Fu-Kuan Tu and Wen-Chung Tai “On the Security
of the Lucas Function” [51], published in 1995, discusses the security of Discrete
Logarithms for Lucas sequences. The authors raised doubts about the hypothesis that the
security of the Lucas function is cryptographically stronger than or at least as strong as
the security of the exponentiation function. They also show that the security of the Lucas
function is polynomial-time equivalent to the generalized discrete logarithm problems.
The paper by Arjen K. Lenstra, Daniel Bleichenbacher and Wieb Bosma “Some
Remarks on Lucas-Based Cryptosystems” [52], published in 1995, discusses the security
of all Lucas sequence-based cryptosystems. For LUC it describes a chosen ciphertext
attack, as a result proving that LUC is not stronger than RSA. Additionally, a
subexponential attack on Discrete Logarithm for Lucas sequences is described.
The computation of Lucas sequences is a very important subject of this
dissertation. The first significant paper was published on the subject in 1995 by S.M. Yen
and C.S. Laih “Fast Algorithms for LUC Digital Signature Computation” [74]. The paper
describes two efficient algorithms to compute Lucas sequences for LUC cryptographic
algorithms. The two algorithms are analogous to square-multiply algorithms for real
integers. Logical extensions of the algorithms published in [74] is represented by the
work by C.S. Laih and S.Y. Chiou “An Efficient Algorithm for Computing the Luc
Chain” first published in 1995 ([18]) and later published again in [19]. It describes an
improvement to [74] that is achieved by using addition chains for LUC exponentiation.
Another significant paper that introduces improvements of [74] by using addition chains
is the paper by C.T. Wang, C.C. Chang, and C.H. Lin “A Method for Computing Lucas
Sequences” published in 1999 [68]. Incidentally, quite a few papers have been published
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on this subject recently, namely [5-9, 56, 57], that do not describe any improvements to
[68].
The LUC cryptosystem is based on one of the two Lucas sequences, namely V.
The computation of both Lucas “sister” sequences is of particular interest. Such an
algorithm was published in 1996 in the paper “Efficient Computation of Full Lucas
Sequences" by M. Joye and J. J. Quisquater. The improved algorithm was published in
[47]. It is utilized as an alternative to the Gaussian integer exponentiation.
For this discussion, the complexity of the multiplication operation is very
important. Depending on the integer size, different multiplication methods are
appropriate. For small bit sizes the naïve multiplication method [44] with complexity of
Θ( n 2 ) is most efficient. For larger bit sizes the Karatsuba-Ofman [43] multiplication
algorithm is universally used. As bit sizes increase, multiple levels of the k-way ToomCook multiplication ([21],[44]) could be applied. For extremely large bit sizes,
algorithms based on Fast Fourier transforms (FFT) such as the Schönhage–Strassen
algorithm ([60]) and Fürer's algorithm ([31]) become practical. Since FFT algorithms are
used for very large bit sizes, the FFT algorithms will not be considered in the subsequent
discussion.
Another important topic is the time complexity of modular reduction. The
performance relative to multiplication is of particular interest. The “mod” division
operation is much slower than multiplication. For small to moderate integer sizes, the
divide-and-conquer algorithm [16] is commonly used for modular division. However, for
efficient modular exponentiation algorithms the costly mod operation is replaced with the
Montgomery reduction or REDC() operation ([55]), because it is much more efficient
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([14]). There are quite a few implementation variations for Montgomery reduction
analyzed in [46] and [17]. Moreover, there are many papers published with marginal
improvements to the Montgomery reduction method, most of them through low level
implementations and specialized hardware (e.g., [1, 11, 20, 23, 29, 39, 71]). The
performance of the reduction algorithms (either modular division or Montgomery REDC)
relative to multiplication is of interest in this discussion. In particular, the range from one
to four multiplications in which all of the contemporary reduction implementations fall is
considered.
Steganography is a process of hiding information in a medium in such a manner
that no one except the anticipated recipient knows of its existence ([61]). A notable
application of steganography is watermarking of digital images, which is a useful tool for
identifying the source, creator, owner, distributor, or authorized consumer of a document
or an image. A way to apply Gaussian integers for image watermarking is described in
this dissertation. There are many innovative watermarking algorithms and many more get
published every day (such as recently published [3, 41, 53, 70] ). In many image
watermarking algorithms, for example in [24, 69, 72, 73], it is required to rearrange the
pixels as a part of the watermarking process. An algorithm that uses Gaussian integers for
the rearrangement step is presented in [48].
Gaussian integers and Gaussian primes have a long history and have been studied
as a mathematical subject. However, only recently they have been used to extend popular
Public Key cryptography algorithms. The published papers directly related to the
proposed topic are [27, 28, 30, 35, 36, 38]. The two most common Public Key
cryptography algorithms RSA and ElGamal have been extended into the field of
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Gaussian integers ([30] and [27]). An extension of another classic cryptography
algorithm, Rabin, is presented in this dissertation. Most of the papers published state that
the extended cryptosystems have advantages over the corresponding real integer
algorithms. However, none of them prove or carefully analyze these statements. This
dissertation would close many of the gaps in the subject.

1.3

Overview of Gaussian Integers, Notation and Definitions

Gaussian integer is a complex number a+bi where both a and b are integers:

Z [i ] = {a + bi : a, b ∈ Z}

(1.1)

Gaussian integers, with ordinary addition and multiplication of complex numbers, form
an integral domain, usually written as Z[i].
In this dissertation, Gaussian integers are denoted with capital letters and real
integers with lower case letters. Also, vector notation for Gaussian integers is used (i.e.,
G=(a,b) is equivalent to G=a+bi ).
The multiplication of Gaussian integers is a case of complex number
multiplication. If G=(a,b) and H=(c,d), then

GH = ( a + bi )(c + di ) = ac − bd + i ( ad + bc ) = ( ac − bd , ad + bc )

Consequently,

(1.2)

15
G 2 = (a + bi )(a + bi ) = a 2 − b 2 + i (2ab) = (a 2 − b 2 , 2ab)

(1.3)

It takes three integer multiplications to multiply two Gaussian integers:

Algorithm 1.3.1 Multiplication of two Gaussian integers
Given: (a, b) , (c, d ) Gaussian integers
Find: Gaussian integer ( x, y ) = ( a, b)(c, d )

v1 = (a + b)(c + d );

(1.4)

v2 = ac;

(1.5)

v3 = bd

(1.6)

x = v2 − v3

(1.7)

y = v1 − v2 − v3

Return (x,y)

It takes only two integer multiplications to square a Gaussian integer:

(1.8)
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Algorithm 1.3.2 Squaring of two Gaussian integers
Given: (a, b) Gaussian integer
Find: Gaussian integer ( x, y ) = (a, b) 2
Return ( x, y ) = ( a, b ) = ( ( a + b )( a − b ) , ab + ab )
2

The addition of Gaussian integers is a case of complex number addition. If
G=(a,b) and H=(c,d), then
G + H = ( a + bi ) + (c + di ) = a + c + i (b + d ) = (a + c, b + d )

(1.9)

The norm of a Gaussian integer is the natural number defined as
| G |=| a + bi |=| (a, b) |= a 2 + b 2

(1.10)

It is known that GH = G H (by the properties of complex numbers).
All real integers are also Gaussian integers. The multiplication of a Gaussian
integer by a real number is a case of the Gaussian integer multiplication:
If G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer and h is a real integer, then:

Gh = ( a + bi ) h = ah + i (bh) = ( ah, bh)

(1.11)

Gh = ( a + bi )( h + i ⋅ 0) = ( a, b)( h, 0) = ( ah, bh)

(1.12)

or equivalently:
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All real primes can be divided into two subgroups: primes p: p mod 4 = 3 and
primes p: p mod 4 = 1. The primes p: p mod 4 = 3 will be referred to as Blum primes and
primes p: p mod 4 = 1 as non-Blum primes.
The prime elements of Z[i] are also known as Gaussian primes. If P is a Gaussian
prime it cannot be represented as a product of non-unit Gaussian integers. The unit
Gaussian integers are 1,-1, i and –i. Real prime numbers p: p mod 4 =3 are also Gaussian
primes. Real prime numbers p: p mod 4 = 1 are not Gaussian primes since they can be
represented as a sum of squares (according to the Fermat's theorem on sums of two
squares) and, consequently, as a product of two Gaussian integers. For instance,
5 = 22 + 12 = (2 + i )(2 − i )
Gaussian primes can be divided into two subgroups. One subgroup consists of
primes P=(p,0), where p is a real prime and p mod 4=3 or a real Blum prime. The second
subgroup consists of primes P=(a,b) where |P| is a real prime and |P| mod 4=1. The
Gaussian primes P=(p,0) will be referred as Blum Gaussian primes and the Gaussian
primes P=(a,b) where |P| is a real prime will be referred as non-Blum Gaussian primes.
The division of Gaussian integers in this dissertation will be denoted as “DIV”. It
is analogous to integer division (commonly referred to as “div”). “DIV” operation may be
defined in several ways. The most common two ways to define it is presented below. If
G=(a,b) and H=(c,d) are Gaussian integers , then G DIV H can be defined as:
1)
⎢ ac + bd ⎥ ⎢ bc − ad ⎥
G DIV H = ⎢
⎥+i⎢
⎥
⎣ |H | ⎦ ⎣ |H | ⎦

(1.13)
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2)
⎛ ac + bd ⎞
⎛ bc − ad ⎞
G DIV H = round ⎜
⎟ + round ⎜
⎟,
⎝ |H | ⎠
⎝ |H| ⎠

(1.14)

where “round” operation is defined as

⎧ ⎢ x + 0.5⎦⎥ , x ≥ 0
⎪⎣
round( x) = ⎨
⎩⎪ ⎡⎢ x − 0.5⎤⎥ , x < 0

(1.15)

Modular congruence is defined over Gaussian integers in the similar way it is defined for
real integers. If G=(a,b) and H=(c,d) are Gaussian integers then

G MOD H = G − H ( G DIV H )

(1.16)

To differentiate Gaussian modulo operation from real integer modulo operation the
notation “MOD” will be used to represent Gaussian modulo operation and “mod” will be
used for real integer modulo operation.
Modular congruencies for Gaussian integers have similar properties as modular
congruencies for real integers. However, there is an important difference: the residues
modulo Gaussian primes are not unique. In fact, if A ≡ B MOD C then A ≡ Bi MOD C ,

A ≡ − Bi MOD C and A ≡ − B MOD C . Moreover, different ways to define division lead
to different outcomes of Gaussian modulo operation. Regardless of the way the division
is defined all the properties of modulo operation hold. When used for cryptography, the
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non-unique outcomes of modulo operation present a problem. However, with consistent
definitions of division this problem is overcome.
The G MOD H operation can be greatly simplified when H=(c,0) (or real integer).
This operation will be defined as follows:

G MOD H = ( a, b)MOD (c, 0) = G mod c = ( a, b) mod c = ( a mod c, b mod c ) ,

(1.17)

where G=(a,b) and H=(c,0) are Gaussian integers; a mod c and b mod c are regular real
integer “mod” operations. This definition is consistent with the definition of modulo
operation for Gaussian integers. Note the same “mod” notation is used to represent real
integer modulo real integer operation and Gaussian integer modulo real integer operation.
This does not cause inconsistencies because the real integer modulo operation can be
looked at as a special case of Gaussian integer modulo real integer operation. If G=(a,0)
and H=(c,0) are Gaussian integers and e=a mod c is a real integer, then

G MOD H = ( a, 0) mod c = (e, 0) ⇔ a mod c = e

(1.18)

Below the formal definitions for modular operation on Gaussian integers are presented.

Definition 1.3.1 MOD Operation on Gaussian integers

If G and H are Gaussian integer, then
G MOD H = G − H ( G DIV H )

Definition 1.3.2 mod Operation on Gaussian integers

(1.19)
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If G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer c is a real integer, then

G mod c = ( a, b) mod c = ( a mod c, b mod c )

(1.20)

Note that Blum Gaussian primes are real primes so Definition 1.3.2 also applies.
The order for Gaussian integers is defined in the some way it is defined for real
integers. Below is the formal definition of the order:

Definition 1.3.3 Order of a Gaussian integers

If H is a Gaussian integer, P is a Gaussian prime, k is a real integer, and k > 1, then k is
referred to as the order of H (or ord(H) = k MOD P) if Hk+1=H (MOD P) and there is
no such m :1 < m < k and H m = H MOD P .

If the Gaussian primes are restricted to Blum Gaussian primes, it is possible to define the
order in terms of “mod” operation:

Definition 1.3.4 Order of a Blum Gaussian integers

If H is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum Gaussian prime, k is a real integer , then k is
referred to as the order of H (or ord(H) = k mod p) if Hk+1=H (mod p) and there is no
such m :1 < m < k and H m = H mod p .

Gaussian integer Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) is defined in the similar way
the real integer DLP is defined. In the subsequent discussion, to differentiate between
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these two problems, the Gaussian integer DLP will be denoted with “LOG” and the real
integer DLP with “log”.

Definition 1.3.5 Gaussian integer discrete logarithm

If G and H are a Gaussian integers, P is a Gaussian Prime, k is a real integer and
G k = H (MOD P) , or LOG G H = k (MOD P) .

For Blum Gaussian primes DLP is defined as follows:

Definition 1.3.6 Gaussian integer discrete logarithm (Blum Gaussian primes)

If G and H are a Gaussian integers, p is a Blum Gaussian prime, k is a real integer and
G k = H (mod p) , then LOG G H = k (mod p) .

Note that a different notation for Gaussian DLP modulo Blum Gaussian primes is not
required because it is differentiated by “MOD” vs. “mod” notation.
The notion of a generator for Gaussian integers is defined in the same way as for
real integers. The formal definition is below:

Definition 1.3.7 Gaussian integer generator (Blum Gaussian primes)

A Gaussian integer G is a generator for a Blum Gaussian prime p iff
ord(G ) = p 2 − 1 (mod p) .

Note that here a generator for non-Blum Gaussian primes is not defined. The reason for
this is that such generators are not relevant to the subsequent discussion.
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It is worth noting that Gaussian integers form a square lattice ([25]). Moreover,
Gaussian integers are examples of a more general type of numbers: quadratic integers
([25]). It is possible to extend the results presented in this dissertation to quadratic
integers as described in [25]. Specifically, it is possible to use imaginary quadratic
integers:

Z[ r ] = {a + b r : a, b ∈ Z and r QNR}

(1.21)

Such generalization would allow for use of all real primes p (not just Blum
primes) and still have the large order ( p 2 − 1 ).

In this dissertation, however, only

Gaussian integers are considered (i.e., Z[ −1] = {a + b −1 : a, b ∈ Z } ). In practice, this is
not a significant restriction since it is very easy to find primes p : p mod 4 = 3 .

1.4

Dissertation Structure

This dissertation contains five main chapters and conclusion. In this chapter, the notation
and definitions were introduced along with the introduction and the survey of references.
Chapter 2 is concerned with the Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) with Gaussian
integers and the exponentiation of Gaussian integers. The main themes of Chapter 2 are
the properties of the Gaussian integer exponentiation, comparisons of the Gaussian
integer DLP to the real integer DLP and computational experiments confirming the
theoretical findings. It is shown that the cryptosystems based on the Gaussian integer
DLP have advantages over equivalent in security real integer cryptosystems. Moreover, a
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novel algorithm for the Gaussian integer exponentiation (Algorithm 2.8.1, Lucas
sequence Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG)) is introduced and its advantages
proven theoretically and experimentally.
In Chapter 3 and Chapter 4, factoring based cryptosystems with Gaussian integers
are discussed. In Chapter 3, an extension of Rabin cryptosystem into domain of Gaussian
integers is introduced and discussed. The extension offers an advantage of using less
reserved bits required for Rabin cryptosystem. In Chapter 4, various extensions or RSA
into the field of Gaussian integers are analyzed. Some of the extensions are shown to be
non-viable and for viable extensions it is hard to quantify any benefits over real integer
RSA.
In Chapter 5, a new algorithm, designed to be used with most existing
watermarking algorithms, is introduced. The new algorithm (Algorithm 5.2.1, Pixel
rearrangement based on Gaussian integers) is based on the Gaussian integer
exponentiation. The performance and benefits of this algorithm are discussed and
compared with the existing algorithms.
After each chapter there is a short summary section. The last chapter (Chapter 6)
is the overall conclusion.

CHAPTER 2
DISCRETE LOGARITHM CRYPTOGRAPHY WITH GAUSSIAN
INTEGERS

2.1

Gaussian Primes P: |P| is a non-Blum Prime

Gaussian primes can be divided into two subgroups. One subgroup consists of primes
P=(p,0) where p is a real prime and p MOD 4=3 or real Blum primes. The second
subgroup consists of primes P=(a,b) where |P| is a real prime and |P| MOD 4=1. In this
work, the first subset of Gaussian primes namely Blum primes is considered. In [27], this
subset was also used to extend ElGamal algorithm.
There are good reasons for restricting Gaussian domain. Some of the reasons are
efficiency and simplicity. The question arises: is there anything missed by considering
only Blum primes? The answer is that nothing is gained by using non-Blum Gaussian
primes to extend well-known cryptosystems. The reason for this is that, for non-Blum
Gaussian primes P, there is one to one mapping between Gaussian integers modulo P and
real integers modulo |P|. This means that it is easy to switch between the two
representations. Below is a simple algorithm to convert Gaussian integers modulo P to
real integers modulo p = |P|.

Algorithm 2.1.1 Convert Gaussian integer to real integer modulo non-Blum Gaussian
prime
Given: G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer,

P a Gaussian prime such that |P| = p is a real prime and p mod 4 =1
Find: real integer g
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Step 1. Compute

s = −1 mod p

(2.1)

s MOD P = i

(2.2)

g = a + bs mod p

(2.3)

such that

Step 2.

is the corresponding real number.

Algorithm 2.1.2 Convert Gaussian integer to real integer modulo non-Blum Gaussian
prime
Given: g a real integer,

p a real prime, p mod 4=1
P a Gaussian prime such that |P| = p
Find: Gaussian integer G
Step 1. Compute G=(g,0) MOD P

A lemma introduced below to prove the validity of Algorithm 2.1.1 and Algorithm 2.2.2.
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Lemma 2.1.1

If G = a + bi and H = c + di are two Gaussian integers, P is a Gaussian prime, |P|=p is
a prime such that p mod 4 = 1 , s = −1 mod p (i.e., s = i MOD P ), ; g = a + bs MOD p ,
h = c + ds MOD p and k are real integers, then the following facts are true:

1)
g MOD P = G and h MOD P = H

(2.4)

2)
g=h MOD p <=> G=H MOD P

(2.5)

gh MOD P = GH MOD P

(2.6)

g+h MOD P = (G+H) MOD P

(2.7)

gk=h MOD p <=> Gk=H MOD P

(2.8)

g MOD P = (a+bs) MOD P= a+bi MOD P = G MOD P

(2.9)

h MOD P = (c+ds) MOD P= c+di MOD P = H MOD P

(2.10)

3)

4)

5)

Proof:

1)

2) Given g=h MOD p.
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a+bs= c+ds (MOD p)

(2.11)

Appling (MOD P) operation to both sides of the equation:

a+bi=c+di (MOD P) => G=H (MOD P)

(2.12)

To prove the reverse assume that it is given that G=H MOD P. Suppose g ≠ h mod p .
a + bs ≠ c + ds ( mod p )

(2.13)

After applying (MOD P) operation to both sides of the equation:
a + bi ≠ c + di (MOD P ) => G ≠ H (MOD P ) ,

(2.14)

which is a contradiction because G=H MOD P. Consequently,

g=h MOD p.

(2.15)

3)

gh MOD P = (a + bs )(c + ds ) MOD P =
= ac + bds 2 + s(bc + ad ) MOD P =
= (ac − bd ) + i (bc + ad ) MOD P = GH MOD P

4)

(2.16)
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g + h MOD P = ( a + bs + c + ds ) MOD P = a + c + s (b + d ) MOD P =
= a + c + i (b + d ) MOD P = G + H MOD P

(2.17)

5) Given gk=h mod p, or:
(a+bs)k = h (MOD p)

(2.18)

Applying (MOD P) operation to both sides of the equation:

(a+bs)k MOD P = h MOD P

(2.19)

((a+bs) MOD P)k MOD P = h MOD P

(2.20)

((a+bi) MOD P)k MOD P = H MOD P

(2.21)

Gk=H MOD P

(2.22)

To prove the reverse, assume that it is given that Gk=H MOD P. Suppose g k ≠ h mod p ,
then:

(a + bs) k ≠ h mod p

Applying (MOD P) operation to both sides of the equation:

(2.23)
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(a + bs MOD P) k MOD P ≠ h MOD P

(2.24)

(a + bi ) k MOD P ≠ h MOD P

(2.25)

G k ≠ H MOD P ,

(2.26)

g k = h mod p

(2.27)

which is a contradiction, thus?

Q.E.D.

Lemma 2.1.1 implies that DLP problem for Gaussian integers modulo non-Blum
Gaussian primes can be solved using real integers. An example below illustrates this
point:

Example 2.1.1 Reduction of the Gaussian integer DLP modulo non-Blum Gaussian
prime to the real integer DLP
Given:

P = 3+2i, |P| = p = |3+2i| = 13.
G = 1+i,
G k= 1-i MOD (3+2i)

Find: Need to find k.
Solution:

Using Lemma 2.1.1 Gk=H MOD P <=> gk=h MOD p.
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For p=13,

−1 =

p − 1 = 12 mod13 . There are two square roots of –1 MOD 13:

5 and 8.
52 MOD 13=12 and 82mod 13=12
However, 8 MOD (3+2i) =-i and 5 MOD (3+2i) =i so set s=5.
g = 1+s = 1+5 = 6 (mod 13)
h = 1-s = 1-5 = -4 = 9 (mod 13)
In order to find k, the real integer DLP needs to be solved:
6k = 9 MOD 13
The solution is k = 4. Indeed, (1+i)4 MOD (3+2i) = 1-i.

Example 2.1.1 illustrates how DLP problem for Gaussian integers is reduced to
the real integer DLP problem. This implies that using Gaussian integers modulo nonBlum Gaussian primes for DLP type cryptosystems does not give any advantages over
the real integers algorithms. It introduces complexity without any apparent advantages.
Table 2.1 below show discrete power Gaussian integer groups MOD P and the
corresponding real integer group MOD |P|.

Table 2.1 Discrete Power Table MOD P=3+2i, |P|=13, −1 mod13 = 5 1

1

(G ) [g ]

1

(1) [1]

2

2

2

3

3

4

4

5

5

6

6

7

7

8

8

9

9

10

10

11

11

12

12

(G ) [g ]

(G ) [g ]

(G ) [g ]

(G ) [g ]

(G ) [g ]

(G ) [g ]

(G ) [g ]

(2) [2]

(-1+i) [4]

(-i) [8]

(-2i) [3]

(1+i) [6]

(-1) [12]

(-2) [11]

(1-i) [9]

(i) [5]

(2i) [10]

(-1-i) [7]

(1) [1]

3

(-2i) [3]

(1-i) [9]

(1) [1]

4

(-1+i) [4]

(-2i) [3]

(-1) [12]

(1-i) [9]

(2i) [10]

(1) [1]

5

(i) [5]

(-1) [12]

(-i) [8]

(1) [1]

6

(1+i) [6]

(2i) [10]

(-i) [8]

(1-i) [9]

(2) [2]

(-1) [12]

(-1-i) [7]

(-2i) [3]

(i) [5]

(-1+i) [4]

(-2) [11]

(1) [1]

7

(-1-i) [7]

(2i) [10]

(i) [5]

(1-i) [9]

(-2) [11]

(-1) [12]

(1+i) [6]

(-2i) [3]

(-i) [8]

(-1+i) [4]

(2) [2]

(1) [1]

8

(-i) [8]

(-1) [12]

(i) [5]

(1) [1]

9

(1-i) [9]

(-2i) [3]

(1) [1]

10

(2i) [10]

(1-i) [9]

(-1) [12]

(-2i) [3]

(-1+i) [4]

(1) [1]

11

(-2) [11]

(-1+i) [4]

(i) [5]

(-2i) [3]

(-1-i) [7]

(-1) [12]

(2) [2]

(1-i) [9]

(-i) [8]

(2i) [10]

(1+i) [6]

(1) [1]

12

(-1) [12]

(1) [1]

Gaussian integers are shown in (). The corresponding real integers are shown in [].

(G ) [g ] (G ) [g ] (G ) [g ] (G ) [g ]
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1

1

g

Table 2.1 illustrates the one to one correspondence between Gaussian integers
modulo non-Blum Gaussian primes and real integers. It also illustrates that
exponentiation operation is also equivalent.
As it was shown, the Gaussian integers modulo non-Blum Gaussian primes are
equivalent to real primes as far as DLP problem is concerned. For this reason such primes
are excluded from the further DLP analysis which focuses on Blum Gaussian primes.

2.2

Common Cryptography Algorithms Based on Discrete Logarithm

Gaussian integers can replace real integers in cryptosystems that are based on the
difficulty of computing the Discrete Logarithm. Two most common of these
cryptosystems are the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol and the ElGamal
algorithm.
In 1976, Diffie and Hellman introduced a new key exchange algorithm. This
algorithm is still widely used.

Algorithm 2.2.1 The original Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol

1. Alice and Bob agree to use a prime number p and a generator g.
2. Alice chooses a secret integer a: 1 < a < p-1, computes

ga mod p

and sends the result to Bob.
3. Bob chooses a secret integer b: 1 < b < p-1, computes

(2.28)
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gb mod p

(2.29)

and sends the result to Alice.
4. Alice computes the shared key as follows

k = ( gb mod p)a mod p

(2.30)

5. Bob computes the shared key as follows

k = ( ga mod p)b mod p

(2.31)

In 1984, Taher ElGamal introduced ElGamal algorithm.

Algorithm 2.2.2 ElGamal algorithm over the field of real integers

Key generation

•

Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and a generator g.

•

Alice generates a secret integer a: 1 < a < p-1 and computes her private key

ka = ga mod p

•

(2.32)

Bob generates a secret integer b: 1 < b < p-1 and computes his private key

kb = gb mod p

(2.33)
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Encryption (Bob’s actions)

•

Bob selects a random integer 1 < s < p-1.

•

Given message m: 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1 Bob computes the ciphertext

•

•

c = m(ka ) S mod p

(2.34)

h = g S mod p

(2.35)

Bob computes hint

Bob sends both c and h to Alice

Decryption (Alice’s actions)

•

Alice computes

m = ch − a mod p

(2.36)

Extending the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol is straightforward. The
extended algorithm is below:

Algorithm 2.2.3 Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol over the field of Gaussian
integers

1. Alice and Bob agree to use a prime number p and a Gaussian integer generator G.
2. Alice chooses a secret integer a: 1 < a < p2-1, computes

Ga mod p

(2.37)
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and sends the result to Bob.
3. Bob chooses a secret integer b: 1 < b < p2-1, computes

Gb mod p

(2.38)

and sends the result to Alice.
4. Alice computes the shared key as follows

K=( Gb mod p)a mod p.

(2.39)

K is a Gaussian integer.
5. Bob computes the shared key as follows

K=( Ga mod p)b mod p

(2.40)

It is also quite easy to extend ElGamal algorithm into the field of Gaussian
integers. Such an extension is described in [27]:

Algorithm 2.2.4 ElGamal algorithm over the field of Gaussian integers
Key generation

•

Alice and Bob agree on a prime p and a Gaussian integer generator G.

•

Alice generates a secret integer a: 1 < a < p2-1 and computes her private key

K a = G a mod p ,

(2.41)
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Ka is a Gaussian integer.
•

Bob generates a secret integer b: 1<b<p2-1 and computes his private key

K b = G b mod p

(2.42)

Kb is a Gaussian integer.
Encryption (Bob’s actions)

•

Bob selects a random integer 1 < s < p2-1.

•

Given message M , Bob computes the ciphertext

C = M ( K a ) S mod p

(2.43)

M, Ka and C are Gaussian integers.
•

Bob computes hint

H = G S mod p

(2.44)

H is a Gaussian integer.
•

Bob sends both C and H to Alice

Decryption (Alice’s actions)

•

Alice computes

M = CH ( p

2

−a )

mod p

(2.45)
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2.3

Properties of Gaussian Integer Exponentiation

For any two complex numbers A and B it is true that |AB|=|A||B|. Gaussian integer is a
special kind of complex number so it is true for Gaussian integers also. When a Gaussian
integer C is multiplied by itself modulo p, in turn, the norm of C mod p gets multiplied
by itself also. This means that C i mod p (i = 1, 2,...) will cycle with a period of
ord ( C ) mod p as illustrated in examples below.

Table 2.2 Repeating Norm Example for Prime p=7
Power:
Norm:

Norm:

1
2
(1,6)
[2]
(1,1)
[2]

2
4
(0,5)
[4]
(0,2)
[4]

3
1
(5,5)
[1]
(5,2)
[1]

4
2
(3,0)
[2]
(3,0)
[2]

5
4
(3,4)
[4]
(3,3)
[4]

6
1
(0,1)
[1]
(0,6)
[1]

7
2
(1,1)
[2]
(1,6)
[2]

8
4
(2,0)
[4]
(2,0)
[4]

9
1
(2,5)
[1]
(2,2)
[1]

10
2
(0,3)
[2]
(0,4)
[2]

11
4
(3,3)
[4]
(3,4)
[4]

12
1
(6,0)
[1]
(6,0)
[1]

13
2
(6,1)
[2]
(6,6)
[2]

14
4
(0,2)
[4]
(0,5)
[4]

15
1
(2,2)
[1]
(2,5)
[1]

16
(4,0)
[2]
(4,0)
[2]

3
(3,1)
[3]
(4,6)
[3]

2
(1,6)
[2]
(1,6)
[2]

6
(4,5)
[6]
(3,2)
[6]

4
(0,5)
[4]
(0,5)
[4]

5
(2,1)
[5]
(5,6)
[5]

1
(5,5)
[1]
(5,5)
[1]

3
(3,6)
[3]
(4,1)
[3]

2
(3,0)
[2]
(3,0)
[2]

6
(2,3)
[6]
(5,4)
[6]

4
(3,4)
[4]
(3,4)
[4]

5
(5,1)
[5]
(2,6)
[5]

1
(0,1)
[1]
(0,1)
[1]

3
(6,3)
[3]
(1,4)
[3]

2
(1,1)
[2]
(1,1)
[2]

6
(2,4)
[6]
(5,3)
[6]

4
(2,0)
[4]
(2,0)
[4]
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Table 2.3 Repeating Norm Examples for Prime p=11

Power:
Norm:

1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
2
4
8
5
10
9
7
3
6
1
2
4
8
5
10
(3,2) (5,1) (2,2) (2,10) (8,1) (0,8) (6,2) (3,7) (6,5) (8,5) (3,9) (2,0) (6,4) (10,2) (4,4)
[2]
[4]
[8]
[5] [10] [9]
[7]
[3]
[6]
[2]
[4]
[8]
[5] [10]
[1]
(10,1) (0,9) (2,2) (7,0) (4,7) (0,8) (3,3) (5,0) (6,5) (0,1) (10,1 (2,0) (9,2) (0,7) (4,4)
[2]
[4]
[8]
[5] [10] [9]
[7]
[3]
[6]
[8]
[5] [10]
[1] 0) [2] [4]

Norm:

3
9
5
4
1
3
9
5
4
1
3
9
5
4
1
(3,4) (4,2) (4,0) (1,5) (5,8) (5,0) (4,9) (9,10) (9,0) (5,3) (3,7) (3,0) (9,1) (1,6) (1,0)
[3]
[9]
[5]
[4]
[3]
[9]
[5]
[4]
[3]
[9]
[5]
[4]
[1]
[1]
[1]
(7,8) (7,2) (0,4) (1,6) (3,6) (6,0) (9,4) (9,1) (0,2) (6,3) (7,3) (3,0) (10,2) (10,6) (0,1)
[3]
[9]
[5]
[4]
[3]
[9]
[5]
[4]
[3]
[9]
[5]
[4]
[1]
[1]
[1]

In addition, Cord(|C|) is a Gaussian integer with norm equal to 1 mod p. In fact, the
Gaussian integers U: |U| = 1 mod p form a cyclic subgroup with an order (p+1). This
subgroup will be referred as a Norm 1 subgroup. Moreover, order of any Gaussian integer
C is a product of ord(|C|) and ord(|U|) where U = Cord(|C|) mod p. The algorithms for
finding Gaussian Generators to use for Discrete Logarithm based cryptography are
derived from this. The series of theorems below will prove these facts formally.

Lemma 2.3.1

If C is a complex number, p is a prime, then

|Cn| = |C|n mod p

(2.46)

Proof:

For any complex number it is true that |Cn| = |C|n , therefore |Cn| = |C|n mod p
Q.E.D
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Lemma 2.3.2

If C is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime
1) ord(C) mod p is divisible by ord(|C|) mod p
2) if Cord(|C|)=U mod p, then |U|=1 mod p
3) if U=Cord(|C|) mod p, then ord(C) mod p is divisible by ord(U) mod p
Proof:

1) Suppose ord(C) mod p is not divisible by ord(|C|) mod p. This would mean
that |Cord(C)| mod p is not equal to 1 but Cord(C)= (1,0). This is a contradiction.
2) |U| must equal to 1 mod p because |Cn| = |C|n mod p and, in this case,
n = ord(| C |) .

3) If ord(C) mod p is not divisible by ord(U) then Cord(C) would not equal to (1,0)
so ord(C) must be divisible by ord(U).
Q.E.D

Lemma 2.3.3

If U is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime and |U| = 1 mod p
1) the maximum order of U is (p+1)
2) ord(U) mod p must divide (p+1)
Proof:

1) Any Gaussian integer A taken to the power (p+1) mod p is in the form (c,0).
In this case, Up+1 mod p could be one of either (1,0) or (-1,0) because

U = 1mod p . Since p+1 is divisible by 4 for all Blum primes, U(p+1)/4 is a
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Gaussian integer of Norm 1 and is a root of degree of Up+1. For (-1,0) all roots of
degree four have a norm equal to –1 mod p. This means that U(p+1) must equal to
(1,0) mod p.
2) If p+1 is not divisible by ord(U) then U(p+1) would not equal to (1,0) so p+1
must be divisible by ord(U).
Q.E.D.

Lemma 2.3.4

If C is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime then

ord(C ) = ord(| C |)ord(C ord(|C|) ) mod p ,

(2.47)

Proof:

ord(C) must be divisible by ord(|C|) and ord(U) so

ord(C) = nord(|C|)ord(U),

(2.48)

where n is an integer. In addition,

Cord(|C|)ord(U) = Uord(U) = (1,0).

Consequently, n must equal to 1.
Q.E.D.

Lemma 2.3.5 The order of Gaussian integers U’ where |U’| = -1

(2.49)
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If U is a Gaussian integer, p is a Blum prime and |U’|=-1 mod p
3) the maximum order of U’ is 2(p+1)
4) ord(U’) mod p must divide 2(p+1)
Proof:

The proof follows directly from Lemma 2.3.3. Note that Gaussian integers U in
Lemma 2.3.3 are squares of U’ mod p. Therefore, 1) and 2) must be true.
Q.E.D.

Corollary 2.3.1

Let C be a Gaussian integer, p a Blum prime. (p2-1) is divisible by ord(C) mod p.

Corollary 2.3.2

Let G be a Gaussian integer, p a Blum prime. G is a generator if and only if
ord(|G|) = p-1

(2.50)

ord(U ) mod p = p + 1 ,

(2.51)

and

where
U = G p −1 mod p ,

(2.52)
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Corollary 2.3.1 validates Algorithm 2.10.1. In Algorithm 2.10.1, all the possible powers
of G mod p that can possibly equal to (1,0) are tested. If G is a generator, only

G( p

2

−1)

mod p equals to (1,0).

2.4

Discrete Logarithm Complexity for Gaussian Integers

When using Gaussian integers for Discrete Logarithm based cryptography, an important
question arises, namely, is it secure? In [38], the Pollard Rho algorithm attack was used
to asses the security of ElGamal algorithm with Gaussian integers. The results were
encouraging: it took twice as much time to compute discrete logarithm for Gaussian
integers. However, these results do not prove that it is secure. In this section, the problem
of Discrete Logarithm Problem (DLP) for Gaussian integers is analyzed.
It is clear that DLP for Gaussian integers is at least as hard as DLP for real
integers, because real integers are a special case of Gaussian integers. Another way of
stating this is that whenever the DLP for Gaussian integer G modulo p is solved, the real
integer DLP for the norm of G is also solved. This means that DLP for Gaussian integers
is at least as hard as DLP for real integers, thus, the Gaussian integer DLP cryptography
is at least as secure as the analogous real integer DLP cryptography.
Suppose

G k mod p = C

is given, where G and C are Gaussian integers. k can be represented as

(2.53)
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k = su + r ,

(2.54)

where u = ord(|G|) mod p, and r = k mod u. If |G| is a real generator, then u equals to p-1.
In order to find LOG G (C ) mod p , it is sufficient to find s and r. Since ord(|G|) mod p
divides p-1 it can be assumed that

u = p −1

(2.55)

for any G.
The problem of finding r is the well known real integer DLP problem:

r = log|G| (| C |) mod p ,

(2.56)

Once r is known, s has to be found. Suppose a Gaussian integer D is

D = C (G −1 ) r mod p ,

(2.57)

U = G ord(|G|) mod p ,

(2.58)

and a Gaussian integer U is

According to Lemma 2.3.2, |U| = |D| = 1 mod p. In order to find s, it is necessary to find
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s = LOGU ( D) mod p

(2.59)

Both U and D belong to the Norm 1 subgroup, because according to Lemma 2.3.2:

|U| = |D| = 1 mod p.

(2.60)

Example 2.4.1 Computing the Gaussian integer DLP in O( p)
Using

Table 2.3, suppose the task is to compute LOG (3,4) (9,1) mod11 . Here G = (3, 4) ; C = (9,1) ;
p = 11 ;

| G | mod p = 3 mod11 ;

| C | mod p = 5 mod11 ;

G −1 mod p = (1, 6) mod11 ;

u = ord ( G ) mod p = 5 .

First find r:

r = log|G| (| C |) mod p = log 3 (5) mod11 = 3 ,

(2.61)
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Now find D and U:

D = C ⋅ (G −1 ) r mod p = (9,1) ⋅ (1, 6)3 mod11 = (5,3) mod11 ,

(2.62)

U = G ord(|G|) mod p = (3, 4)5 mod11 = (5,8) mod11 ,

(2.63)

D = ( 5,3) = 52 + 32 = 34 = 1(mod11) ,

(2.64)

U = ( 5,8 ) = 52 + 82 = 89 = 1(mod11) .

(2.65)

s = LOGU ( D ) mod p = LOG (5,8) (5,3) mod11 = 2 .

(2.66)

Note that:

and

Now find s:

To find k =LOG (3,4) (9,1) mod11 :

k = su + r = 2 ⋅ 5 + 3 = 13

Indeed, (3, 4)13 mod11 = (9,1) .

(2.67)
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The problem (2.66) is different from the real integer DLP. The solution to this
problem is the key to understanding of how much complexity Gaussian integer extension
adds to DLP. One way to solve it is to use any general DLP algorithm for a cyclic group,
such as Baby-step giant-step or Pollard’s Rho algorithm. These algorithms work for any
cyclic group and their running time is O( N ) , where N is the order of this cyclic group.
According to Lemma 2.3.3, the order of Norm 1 subgroup modulo prime p is p+1. Thus, s
can be computed in O( p + 1) = O( p) operations. Consequently, it is possible to
compute Gaussian integer discrete logarithm with O

( p ) , because the running time for

solving (2.5.4) is O( p − 1) = O( p) . The combined running time for solving the
Gaussian integer DLP is

O( p + 1) + O( p − 1) = O( p) .

(2.68)

In [36] and [38], Pollard’s Rho Algorithm and Baby-step giant-step were used to
compute DLP for Gaussian integers. Both algorithms have the average running time of

O( n) where n is the order of the cyclic group. For Gaussian integers n=p2-1 ([22]).
Consequently, the expected running time for DLP attack, as described in [36] and [38], is

O( p 2 − 1) = O( p 2 ) = O( p ) .

(2.69)
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The complexity of solution of the DLP can be further reduced if the generalized
BSGS algorithm [64] is applied. The paper demonstrates several enhancements of the
traditional Shank’s algorithm.
Currently, the fastest algorithm for real integer Discrete Logarithm runs in subexponential time, which is substantially faster than O( p) . The apparent question arises:
is there such an algorithm for the Norm 1 subgroup? The answer to this question is the key
to understanding of how much complexity Gaussian integer extension adds to DLP. In the
next section, this question is addressed.

2.5

Reducing Gaussian Integer DLP to Lucas Sequences DLP

The Gaussian integer exponentiation operation can be represented as a recurrence. This
representation is useful to derive and prove several formulas. It is useful to illustrate and
prove properties that are not easily seen with other representations. Let C=(a,b) be a
Gaussian integer and Ck=(a,b)k=(ak,bk), then

C0 = (1,0) = (a0,b0),

(2.70)

C1 = (a,b) = (a1,b1),

(2.71)

C2 = (a2-b2,2ab) = (a2,b2), … Ck = (a,b)k = (ak,bk).

(2.72)
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The two dimensions of C are the recurrences ai and bi with an interesting property,
described in the following theorem:

Theorem 2.5.1

Gaussian integer Ck mod p can be represented as a recurrence:

C k = ( ak , bk ) = (2aak −1 − C ak −2 , 2abk −1 − C bk −2 ) .

(2.73)

where a0=1, a1=a, b0=0, b1=b.
Proof: The theorem can be easily proved using the mathematical induction. The

induction base:

C 2 = ( a 2 − b 2 , 2ab ) = ( 2aa1 − C a0 , 2ab1 − C b0 )

(2.74)

is a true identity, since a0 = 1, a1 = a, b0 = 0, b1 = b.
Assume that for r ≤ k, the recurrence is true. The following needs to be proved:

C k = ( ak , bk ) = ( 2aak −1 − C ak − 2 , 2abk −1 − C bk − 2 )

(2.75)

C 2 = (a2 , b2 ) = (2a 2 − C , 2ab) ,

(2.76)

Using,

49

Q.E.D.

C k = ( ak , bk ) = C k − 2C 2 =

(2.77)

= ( ak −2 a2 − bk −2b2 , ak −2b2 + bk − 2 a2 )

(2.78)

ak = ak − 2 a2 − bk − 2b2 =

(2.79)

= ak −2 (2a 2 − C ) − bk −2 2ab =

(2.80)

= ak −2 2a 2 − bk −2 2ab − C ak − 2 = .

(2.81)

= 2a ( aak −2 − bk −2b ) − C ak − 2 = 2aak −1 − C ak − 2

(2.82)

bk = ak − 2b2 + bk − 2 a2 = ak − 2 2ab + bk − 2 ( 2a 2 − C ) =

(2.83)

= ak − 2 2ab + bk − 2 2a 2 − bk − 2 C = .

(2.84)

= 2a(ak −2b + bk −2 a) − bk −2 C = 2abk −1 − C bk − 2 .

(2.85)
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Using this theorem it is possible to show how to reduce the Gaussian integer DLP
to the Lucas sequences DLP. The theorem below describes this relationship.

Theorem 2.5.2

If C=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer, Ck=(ak,bk), then the sequence a0,a1,…,ak can be
represented as a standard Lucas sequence V ( 2a, C ) as follows:
Vi ( 2a, C ) = 2ai ,

i = 0,1,....

(2.86)

and the sequence b0,b1,…,bk relates to the Lucas sequence U ( 2a, C ) as follows:

U i ( 2a, C ) = bi b −1 ,

i = 0,1,.... .

(2.87)

Proof: Using mathematical induction:

1) The theorem is correct for k=0 and k=1:

a0 = a 0 = 1 ⇒ V0 = 2 = 2a0

(2.88)

a1 = a1 = a ⇒ V1 = 2a = 2a1 .

(2.89)

b0 = 0 ⇒ U 0 = 0 = 0b −1 .

(2.90)
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b1 = b1 = b ⇒ V1 = 1 = b1b −1 .

(2.91)

2) Assume Vi (2a,| C |) = 2ai and U k (2a, C ) = bk b −1 for i < k .
3) Prove Vk ( 2a, C ) = 2ak and U k ( 2a, C ) = bk b −1 . According to Theorem 2.5.2:

ak = 2ak −1 − C ak − 2 .

(2.92)

bk = 2bk −1 − C bk − 2 .

(2.93)

Using the assumption of step 2) of the induction:

Q.E.D.

ak = 2aak −1 − C ak − 2 = aVk −1 ( 2a, C ) − 2−1 C Vk − 2 ( 2a, C )

(2.94)

2ak = 2aVk −1 ( 2a, C ) − C Vk − 2 ( 2a, C ) = Vk ( 2a, C )

(2.95)

bk = 2abk −1 − C bk − 2 = 2abU k −1 ( 2a, C ) − b C U k − 2 ( 2a, C )

(2.96)

bk b −1 = 2aU k −1 ( 2a, C ) − C U k − 2 ( 2a, C ) = U k ( 2a, C ) .

(2.97)
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In other words, whenever the Gaussian integer C=(a,b) is raised to some power,
the first dimension contains the Lucas sequence Vk and the second dimension contains
the Lucas sequence Uk . The table below illustrates this.

Table 2.4 Gaussian Integer Exponentiation and Lucas Sequences Side-by-side
Power k: 0
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
k
(3,7)
(1,0) (3,7) (17,4) (4,17) (7,3) (0,1) (12,3) (15,17) (2,4) (16,7) (18,0) (16,12) (2,15)
mod 19
2ak mod
2
6
15
8
14
0
5
11
4
13
17
13
4
19
Vk (6,1)
mod 19
bk b-1
mod 19
Uk(6,1)
mod 19

2

6

15

8

14

0

5

11

4

13

17

13

4

0

1

6

16

14

11

14

16

6

1

0

18

13

0

1

6

16

14

11

14

16

6

1

0

18

13

The relationship described by Theorem 2.5.2 allows to reduce the Gaussian
integer DLP to a better-known problem of the Lucas sequences DLP. Two cryptosystems
based on DLP for Lucas sequences LUCDIF and LUCELG were introduced in [63].
These are Diffie-Hellman and ElGamal algorithms formulated with Lucas sequences
Vk ( P, Q) where Q ≡ 1mod p . The main selling point of “LUC” algorithms was a notion
that they are not based on exponentiation; therefore, presumably, they are not vulnerable
to sub-exponential time attacks. However, these assumptions were proven to be wrong.
Papers [52] and [51] show that sub-exponential time algorithms can be applied to Lucas
sequences.
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On the other hand, Lucas sequences still offer a significant security advantage
over real integers. The sub-exponential algorithm for Lucas sequences would have to run
in a group of order p2-1, as opposed the group of order of order p-1 with real integers.
Another important point to note is that Norm 1 subgroup described in previous
section contains Lucas sequences Vk ( P, Q ) and U k ( P, Q) with Q ≡ 1mod p (according
to Theorem 2.5.2). Consequently, even though the order of Norm 1 subgroup is p+1, the
sub-exponential DLP algorithm would have to be applied in a group of order p2-1. This
means that the Gaussian integer DLP is substantially harder then the real integer DLP
(with algorithms currently known). Moreover, when solving the Gaussian integer DLP
one would have to solve two problems:
1. The Lucas sequences DLP with Q ≡ 1mod p (or equivalently the Gaussian integer
DLP in the Norm 1 subgroup).
2. The real integer DLP.
The fact that these two problems seem to be very different, bodes well for
cryptography algorithms based on the Gaussian integer DLP. A solution of one problem
may not lead to a solution of the other, thus the Gaussian integers offer additional
protection.
When comparing the speed of the algorithms that utilize the DLP over Lucas
sequences with the corresponding algorithms that utilize Gaussian integers, a strong case
could be made for Gaussian integers even though this topic is not in scope of this
dissertation. Nevertheless, the indications are that the Gaussian integer exponentiation is
not slower than Lucas sequence computation under LUC cryptographic algorithms, but is
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most likely faster. The actual speed varies greatly with implementation details and the
choice of exponentiation algorithms.
The Gaussian integer DLP is a combination of two problems: the well known real
integer DLP and the DLP over an interesting subgroup of Gaussian integer group: Norm 1
subgroup. The complexity of Norm 1 subgroup DLP holds the key to the understanding of
the complexity of the Gaussian integer DLP. The reduction of the Gaussian integer DLP
to the Lucas sequences DLP allows to assess the security of the Gaussian integer DLP.
The Norm 1 DLP turned out to be equivalent in security to the Lucas sequences DLP used
in well-known cryptosystems LUCDIF and LUCELG. LUCDIF and LUCELG are
thought to be more secure than the corresponding algorithms with real integers. Therefore,
the algorithms based on the Gaussian integer DLP (such as the one in [27]) are more
secure. Furthermore, the Gaussian integer DLP contains the real integer DLP, providing
additional security through diversification. Luckily, algorithms with Gaussian integers are
efficient and easy to implement. Moreover, they are potentially more efficient than the
corresponding “LUC” algorithms. Thus, the algorithms based on the Gaussian integer
DLP offer a great alternative to the real integer DLP or “LUC” algorithms.

2.6

Multiplication of Gaussian Integers vs. Real Integer Multiplication

Since the size of the group of the exponentiation cyclic group of Gaussian integers is
p 2 − 1 , it is appropriate to compare the Gaussian integer multiplication modulo p to real
integer multiplication modulo q, where q is double the size of p. Suppose n = ⎡⎢log 2 p ⎤⎥
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(or in other words n is the number of binary bits of p). Let q be the closest prime to p2. In
that case, the size of q in bits would be approximately 2n or

⎢⎡log 2 q ⎥⎤ ≈ 2n .

(2.98)

For small n, the naïve multiplication method [44] with complexity of Θ( n 2 ) is
most efficient. For larger n, the Karatsuba-Ofman [43] multiplication algorithm is
appropriate with the running time of Θ(n1.585 ) . For even larger n, the Toom-Cook 3-way
(or Toom-3) [44] multiplication with the running time Θ(n1.465 ) is appropriate. As n
increases further, multiple levels of the k-way Toom-Cook multiplication with the
running time Ο ( n log(2 k −1)/log k ) can be applied ([44]). For extremely large n, the algorithms
based on the Fast Fourier transforms (FFT) are more efficient. The Schönhage–Strassen
algorithm [60] is based on the FFT and runs in Ο( n log n log log n) . The Fürer's algorithm
published in [31] is also based on the FFT and offer an even better running time, that is
Ο(n log n2log*n ) . The FFT algorithms have a lot of overhead, and, consequently are used
for very large n, far larger then the numbers used for public key cryptography. Therefore,
the FFT algorithms will not be considered in the subsequent discussion.
In order to do a theoretical comparison of the Gaussian integer multiplication to
the real integer multiplication, three cases need to be considered:
1) The numbers are small enough to warrant the naïve multiplication method. Under this
assumption, it is clear that the Gaussian integer multiplication time grows slower than

56

the real integer multiplication time. Assuming t (n) is the time it takes to multiply two
real integers of size n modulo p:

tG = 3t (n) + cG n + dG .

(2.99)

where tG is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p,
cG is the overhead ( integer additions modulo p), and dG is a constant overhead term.
On the other hand:
tr = t (2n) = 4t (n) + cr n + d r ,

(2.100)

where tr is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of the size 2n modulo q,
cr and d r are the overhead terms associated with the naïve algorithm. Here cr is
smaller then cG , while dG and d r terms are negligible.
tG 3
= .
n →∞ t
4
r

lim

(2.101)

This constitutes a maximum of 25% theoretical improvement. Note that the
assumption that n → ∞ is incorrect because, under most implementations, at some
threshold, the naïve method would be replaced by a more efficient algorithm. There is
more overhead associated with the Gaussian integer multiplication, therefore, for a
small n, tr will be lower than tG .
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2) The numbers are sufficiently large to warrant the Karatsuba multiplication, but not
large enough to warrant the Toom-3 multiplication. In this case, tG would be
represented by the same formula as in 1). Assuming t (n) is the time it takes to
multiply two real integers of size n modulo p:

tG = 3t (n) + cG n + dG .

(2.102)

where tG is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p, c1
is the overhead ( integer additions modulo p).
On the other hand, using the recursive step:

tr = t (2n) = 3t (n) + cr n + d r .

(2.103)

where tr is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q, cr is the
overhead associated with the Karatsuba algorithm (it is the time related to the number
of additions). Here cr is about twice the size of cG , while dG and d r terms are
negligible.
Since cr is about twice as large as cG , it is safe to conclude that, under the Karatsuba
tG
= 1 . There is more overhead associated with the
n →∞ t
r

multiplication, cG < cr and lim

Gaussian integer multiplication, therefore, for small n, tr will be lower than tG .

58

3) The numbers are sufficiently large to warrant the Toom-3 multiplication. Under this
assumption, the real integer multiplication time grows slower than the Gaussian
integer multiplication. Assuming t (n) is the time it takes to multiply two real integers
of size n modulo p:

tG = 3t (n) + cG n + dG .

(2.104)

where tG is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p,
cG is the overhead ( integer additions modulo p), and dG is a constant overhead term.
On the other hand:

tr = t (2n) = 2.76t (n) + cr n + d r .

(2.105)

where tr is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q, cr and
d r are the overhead terms associated with the naïve algorithm.
lim

n →∞

tG
3
≈
≈ 1.087 .
tr 2.76

(2.106)

This means that the Gaussian integer multiplication is about 9% slower under this
setting. Note that the assumption that n → ∞ is incorrect because, under most
implementations, at some threshold, the Toom-3 method would be replaced by more
efficient algorithm. There is more overhead associated with the Gaussian integer
multiplication, therefore, for small n tr will be lower than tG .
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The same arguments apply to squares, even though the squaring is generally faster
than the multiplication. In theory, the squaring is up to twice as fast as multiplication,
because the multiplication can be done using two squares:

ab =

( a + b) 2 − ( a − b) 2
.
4

(2.107)

In practice, however, the square is much slower then half of a multiplication. The
GMP manual [34] states that a square is around 1.5 times faster than a multiplication, if
the library settings are optimized. Incidentally, the Gaussian integer squaring is also 1.5
times faster relatively to the Gaussian integer multiplication on all platforms (refer to
Algorithm 1.3.1 and Algorithm 1.3.2). Therefore, the relationship between the speed of
the multiplication and the square is the same for Gaussian integers.
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Figure 2.1 The ratio of the running time of multiplication of two numbers of the equal
size vs. the running time of square of a number of the same size. The graph represents a
typical performance of GMP 5.0.1 library on various platforms.
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It is possible that the threshold cutoff size would lie between n and 2n (for
example the real integer multiplication will be done with the Toom-3 algorithm, but the
Gaussian integer multiplication will be done under the Karatsuba or the naïve algorithm).
In this case, the exact thresholds would have to be known in order to compare the two
multiplications (or squares) correctly. Unfortunately, the exact thresholds at which the
one multiplication algorithm is more efficient then the other are heavily dependant on the
architecture and the implementation. The bit count of thresholds varies widely among
various architectures and implementations.
Figure 2.2 and Figure 2.3 show the threshold values for different squaring
algorithms used by GMP 5.0.1. The values are compiled during the installation of the
library. The purpose of this figure is to give a sense for the threshold values. The figures
show the following:
1)

the thresholds for squares tend to be higher than for multiplications

2)

the thresholds tend to be larger for 64 bit CPUs than for 32 bit CPUs.
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Figure 2.2 The distribution of optimal multiplication thresholds among various platforms
for GMP 5.0.1.
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Figure 2.3 The distribution of optimal square thresholds among different platforms and
counts for GMP 5.0.1.

Suppose tG is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo
p and tr is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q. Suppose
that both multiplications are performed with the same multiplication algorithm that has
the running time of

Ο(nα ) .

(2.108)
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(i.e., α = 2

for naïve, α = 1.585 for Karatsuba and α = 1.465 for Toom-3

multiplication). As mentioned before, the FFT multiplication algorithms are not
considered, so the formula (2.108) is sufficient to describe all applicable multiplication
algorithms for the analysis.

For simplicity, an assumption can be made that both

multiplications are performed using the same algorithm, even though, in reality, it is
possible that the threshold cutoff size would lie between n and 2n (for example the real
integer multiplication will be done with the Toom-3 algorithm, but the Gaussian integer
multiplication will be done with the Karatsuba or naïve algorithm). In this case, the exact
thresholds have to be known to compare the multiplications (or squares) correctly. As
mentioned above, the exact thresholds at which the one multiplication algorithm is more
efficient then the other are heavily dependant on the architecture and the implementation.
Moreover, this assumption would make the real integer exponentiation look slightly
faster. Therefore, this assumption could be allowed without compromising the proof that
the Gaussian integer exponentiation is faster. The overhead (lower order operations like
additions or subtractions) is ignored. Under these assumptions:

tG
3nα
3
=
= α .
α
n →∞ t
(2n)
2
r

lim

The ratio for squares is the same, assuming the real integer square is
sG
2nα
3
lim =
= α .
n →∞ s
2
α
r
( 2n ) 2
3

(2.109)

2
tr :
3

(2.110)
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where sG is the time it takes to multiply two Gaussian integers of size n modulo p and sr
is the time it takes to multiply two real integers of size 2n modulo q.
From (2.109) it is clear that tG < tr under the naïve multiplication algorithm,
tG ≈ tr under the Karatsuba multiplication and tG > tr under the Toom-3 multiplication.
As stated before, the cutoff thresholds vary widely it would be an impossible task to
analyze all the possible combinations of platforms and bit counts. It is obvious with some
combinations of platforms and bit counts real integer multiplication will be faster, and,
with many, the Gaussian integer multiplication will be faster.
Fortunately, even though it is hard to answer definitively which multiplication is
faster, it is possible to say that the Gaussian integer multiplication modulo p is faster. The
differences between two multiplications are insignificant compared with the advantages
of the “mod” operation for Gaussian integers. Therefore, the Gaussian integer
exponentiation turns out to be faster.
The modulo division operation is much slower than the multiplication. For small
to moderate integer sizes, the divide-and-conquer division algorithm ([16]) is commonly
used. The speed of this division algorithm depends on the multiplication algorithm used.
If M (n) = Dnc is the multiplication time and T ( n) is the division time of an integer of
size 2n by an integer of size n, then

T ( n) <

This translates to

1
2

c −1

−1

M ( n) + Ο(n log n) .

(2.111)

65

T (n) < n 2 + Ο(n log n)

(2.112)

T (n) < 2n1.585 + Ο(n log n)

(2.113)

for the naïve multiplication,

for the Karatsuba multiplication (which agrees with [15]), and to

T (n) < 2.63n1.465 + Ο(n log n)

(2.114)

for the Toom-3 multiplication. ([16],[40],[34]). In practice, the speed of the division is
about two to four times slower than the speed of the multiplication for moderately large
integer sizes (section 16.2.3 of [34],[40]).
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Figure 2.4 Running time of mod operation versus multiplication using GMP 5.0.1
library on AMD Opteron Model 2218 @2.6 GHz Dual core, 8GB of RAM, RHEL Linux
4.2 kernel 2.6.9 (64 bit).
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In exponentiation algorithms, the costly mod operation is replaced with the
Montgomery reduction or REDC() operation ([55]), which is more efficient. It is possible
to implement Montgomery reduction with the Gaussian integer exponentiation also. In
fact, the Gaussian integer exponentiation still retains its speed advantages with
Montgomery reduction used in place of mod. The REDC() operation speed varies
depending on a platform and an implementation from about 1.2 multiplications to two
multiplications ([14]). With GMP 5.0.1, the average is about 1.5 multiplications.
Whether the modulo division or the Montgomery REDC() function is used, the
speed of the reduction at each multiplication or square step can be expressed as

R ( n ) = β tr ( n) ,

(2.115)

where R ( n) is the division time of an integer of size 2n by an integer (prime in this case)
of size n, tr ( n) is the multiplication time of two real integers of size n, and β :1 < β < 4 is
some constant.
Suppose TG is the time required for a multiplication with a reduction for Gaussian
integers and Tr is the time required for a multiplication with a reduction for real integers.

TG 3tr ( n) + 2 R (n)
3t ( n) + 2 β tr ( n)
3 + 2β
.
=
= α r
= α
α
n →∞ T
tr (2n) + R (2n) 2 tr ( n) + 2 β tr ( n) 2 (1 + β )
r

lim

For squares, the ratio would be slightly different:

(2.116)
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SG
2t (n) + 2 R (n)
6t ( n) + 6 β tr (n)
6(1 + β )
.
= r
= α r
= α
α
n →∞ S
2
β
β
t
n
t
n
+
+
2
2
(
)
3*
2
(
)
2
(2
3
)
r
r
r
tr (2n) + R (2n)
3

lim

(2.117)

where SG is the time required for a multiplication with a reduction for Gaussian integers
and S r is the time required for a multiplication with a reduction for real integers.

Table 2.5 Summarized Estimates of the Multiplication Running Time Ratio Based on
the Formula (2.116)

Naïve

Karatsuba

Toom-3

Toom-4

α=2

α=1.585

β=1

0.63

0.83

0.91

0.94

β=1.2

0.61

0.82

0.89

0.93

β=1.4

0.60

0.81

0.88

0.91

β=1.5

0.60

0.80

0.87

0.91

β=1.7

0.59

0.79

0.86

0.90

β=2

0.58

0.78

0.85

0.88

β=2.2

0.58

0.77

0.84

0.87

β=2.5

0.57

0.76

0.83

0.86

β=3

0.56

0.75

0.82

0.85

β=4

0.55

0.73

0.80

0.83

α=1.465 α=1.4037

Table 2.6 Summarized Estimates of the Square Running Time Ratio Based on the
Formula (2.117)
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Naïve

Karatsuba

Toom-3

Toom-4

α=2

α=1.585

β=1

0.60

0.80

0.87

0.91

β=1.2

0.59

0.79

0.85

0.89

β=1.4

0.58

0.77

0.84

0.88

β=1.5

0.58

0.77

0.84

0.87

β=1.7

0.57

0.76

0.83

0.86

β=2

0.56

0.75

0.82

0.85

β=2.2

0.56

0.74

0.81

0.84

β=2.5

0.55

0.74

0.80

0.84

β=3

0.55

0.73

0.79

0.82

β=4

0.54

0.71

0.78

0.81

α=1.465 α=1.4037

As Table 2.5 and Table 2.6 show, the Gaussian integer exponentiation is faster on
all platforms because the underlying multiplication and square operations (combined with
Montgomery or modulo reductions) are faster for Gaussian integers. The exact speedup
would depend on a platform, integer sizes, and the exponentiation algorithm logic (i.e.,
number of multiplications and squares). Realistically, for the integer sizes used for Public
Key cryptography (1000-4000 bits) the expected speedup is around 20% with Gaussian
integers. The rational for this is that the estimated speedup ratios for multiplications and
squares for Montgomery reduction with β = 1.5 and the Karatsuba multiplication are
0.80 and 0.77, so, regardless of the ratio of multiplications/squares in a particular
exponentiation algorithm, the combined ratio would be under 0.80 (i.e., 20% speedup).
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2.7

Computation of Lucas Sequences

Theorem 2.5.1 and Theorem 2.5.2 show the relationship between Gaussian integers and
Lucas sequences. According to these theorems, it is possible to use one to compute the
other. In this section, an existing algorithm for computing Lucas sequences is reviewed
and an improvement is introduced. In [74], the efficient algorithm was published to
compute Vn for Q=1. Below, this algorithm is extended to compute both Un and Vn by
using the following relation:

Uk =

2Vk +1 − PVk
.
P 2 − 4Q

Algorithm 2.7.1 Computation of Lucas Sequences with Q = 1
n −1

Inputs: k = ∑ ki 2i , where n = ⎢⎡log 2 k ⎥⎤
i =0

(P, Q = 1) – Lucas sequence parameters
Outputs: (Vk, Uk)

1. Vl := 2; Vh := P;
2. for j=n-1 downto 0
3.

if (k[j] = 1)

4.

Vl := Vh * Vl – P;

5.

Vh := Vh * Vh – 2;

6.
7.

else

Vh := Vh * Vl – P;

(2.118)
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8.
9.

Vl := Vl * Vl – 2;
endif

10. endfor
11. Uk := (2*Vh-P*Vl)/(P*P-4*Q);
12. return (Vl,Uk)

Note that the number of multiplications in Algorithm 2.8.1 is 2 ⎡⎢log 2 k ⎤⎥ + c , where c is a
small constant. Additionally, the algorithm can be used to compute Un and Vn modulo
prime p.
The algorithm to compute both Un and Vn for any P and Q was published in [42] .
Such an algorithm could be useful for various purposes. As an example, the authors
suggest using it to compute the order of an elliptic curve. It is useful for cryptosystems
based on exponentiation of Gaussian integers as will be discussed in subsequent sections.
The improvement to the algorithm published in [42] was published in [47]:

Algorithm 2.7.2 Computation of Lucas Sequences for any P and Q
n −1

Inputs: k = ∑ ki 2i , where n = ⎡⎢log 2 k ⎤⎥
i =0

(P, Q) – Lucas sequence parameters
Outputs: (Vk, Uk)

1. Vl := 2; Vh := P;
2. Ql :=1; Qh := 1;
3. for j=n-1 downto 0
4. Ql := Ql * Qh;
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5. if (k[j] = 1)
6.

Qh := Ql * Q;

7.

Vl := Vh * Vl – P * Ql;

8.

Vh := Vh * Vh – 2 * Qh;

9. else
10.

Qh := Ql;

11.

Vh := Vh * Vl – P * Ql;

12.

Vl := Vl * Vl – 2 * Qh;

13. endif
14. endfor
15. Uk := (2*Vh-P*Vl)/(P*P-4*Q);
16. return (Vl,Uk)

Note that Algorithm 2.7.2 for Q = 1 or Q = -1 still has same running time as
Algorithm 2.7.1. The number of multiplications in Algorithm 2.7.2 is 2 ⎡⎢log 2 k ⎥⎤ + c ,
where c is a small constant.

2.8

Exponentiation of Gaussian Integers

As shown in the previous sections, the Gaussian integer exponentiation is faster then the
real integer exponentiation when real integers are replaced with the Gaussian integers.
However, an even faster exponentiation algorithm for Gaussian integers can be devised.
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It is based on the relationship between Gaussian integers and Lucas sequences described
in [50].

Algorithm 2.8.1 Lucas sequence Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG)
Inputs: (a, b) Gaussian integer

p – prime such that p mod 4 = 3
n - exponent
Output: Gaussian integer ( x, y ) = (a, b)n mod p

1. r := (a, b)

p +1
4

mod p

2. (c, d ) = r −1 (a, b) mod p
3. h = r n mod( p −1) mod p
4. m = n mod(2( p + 1))
5. if ( r 2 == (a, b) (mod p ) )
6.

Compute Lucas sequences Vm ( P = 2c, Q = 1) and U m ( P = 2c, Q = 1)

7. else
8.

Compute Lucas sequences Vm ( P = 2c, Q = −1) and U m ( P = 2c, Q = −1)

9. endif
10. x = hVm

p +1
mod p
2

11. y = hU m c mod p
12. return (x,y)
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Given a Gaussian integer (a, b) , prime p : p mod 4 = 3 and n : 0 < n < p 2 − 1 ,
suppose the aim is compute (a, b) n mod p . First step is to compute

r = ( a, b)

p +1
4

mod p .

(2.119)

r would be the square root of | ( a, b) | if a square root exists. If | ( a, b) | is QNR (i.e., the
square root does not exist) modulo p, then r = − (a, b) mod p . Next step is to compute

(c, d ) = r −1 (a, b) mod p .

(2.120)

It is important to note that (c, d ) mod p = 1 or -1 , because:

2

2

a 2 + b2
⎛a⎞ ⎛b⎞
(c, d ) = ⎜ ⎟ + ⎜ ⎟ =
(mod p ) .
r2
⎝r⎠ ⎝r⎠

(2.121)

r 2 is either − (a, b) mod p or (a, b) mod p depending on whether | ( a, b) | is QNR or not.
(a, b) was factored into a product of a real integer r and Gaussian integer (c, d ) , and

(c, d ) mod p = 1 or -1 :

( a, b) = r (c, d ) mod p .

(2.122)
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To compute (a, b)n mod p the following values have to be computed:

r n mod( p −1) mod p

(2.123)

(c, d ) n mod p .

(2.124)

and

To compute (2.123) it is possible to use any available real integer exponentiation
modulo prime algorithm (the order of real integer modulo p is p − 1 , so n can be reduced
modulo p − 1 ). In order to compute (2.124), the relationship between Gaussian integers
and Lucas sequences described in algorithm in [50] could be used. To compute (2.124), it

(

)

(

is enough to compute Vm 2c, ( c, d ) , U m 2c, ( c, d )

( c, d )

n

)

and

m
⎛V
⎞
= ( c, d ) = ⎜ m , U m d ⎟ ( mod p ) ,
⎝ 2
⎠

(2.125)

where m = n mod(2( p + 1)) (the order of Lucas sequences with Q = 1 is p + 1 (Lemma
2.3.3) and with Q = −1 is 2( p + 1) (Lemma 2.3.5)). Vm and U m could be efficiently
computed using any published algorithm to compute Lucas sequences, such as [74] or
[68]. The algorithms published in [74] and [68] would only compute Vm ( 2c,1) , however,
they can be easily enhanced to compute Vm ( 2c, −1) , U m ( 2c, −1) or U m ( 2c,1) . Finally
few more multiplications are needed to get the final answer:
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(a, b) n = r n (c, n) n (mod p) .

(2.126)

Example 2.8.1 Gaussian integer exponentiation with LSEG Algorithm
Inputs: ( a, b) = (2,5) Gaussian integer

p = 23 – prime
n = 423 – exponent
Output: Gaussian integer ( x, y ) = (a, b)n mod p

1. r := (a, b)

p +1
4

mod p = ( 22 + 52 )

23+1
4

mod 23 = 66 mod 23 = 12

2. (c, d ) := r −1 (a, b) mod p = 12−1 (2,5) mod 23 = 2(2,5) mod 23 = (4,10)
3. h := r n mod( p −1) mod p = 12423mod 22 mod 23 = 125 mod 23 = 18
4. m := n mod(2( p + 1)) = 423 mod 48 = 39
5.

(r

2

== (a, b) (mod p ) ) is true: 12 2 mod 23 == 6 , therefore:

6.

Compute Vm ( P = 2c, Q = 1) = V39 (8,1) = 18(mod 23)

7.

Compute U m ( P = 2c, Q = 1) = U 39 (8,1) = 6(mod 23)

8.

x = hVm

p +1
mod p = 18*18*12 mod 23 = 1
2

9. y = hU m c mod p = 18*6*10 mod 23 = 22
10. return (x,y) = (1,22)
The speed advantage of Algorithm 2.8.1 is due to the fact that it does less work.
Note that the most expensive operations in this algorithm are two real integer
exponentiations (lines 1 and 3) and one Lucas sequences computation (line 6 or line 8).
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The speed advantage of Algorithm 2.8.1 would vary depending on the exponentiation
algorithm used and there are too many variations to consider. To illustrate the speed
advantage of Algorithm 2.8.1, it can be compared to the sliding window Montgomery
Gaussian integer exponentiation algorithm, same as the one implemented by GMP ([34]
section 16.4.2, [54] algorithm 14.85). The exponentiation algorithm modulo prime
implemented by GMP is a highly efficient implementation and is widely used for
cryptographic algorithms. Moreover, the sliding window exponentiation algorithm holds
advantage over many other exponentiation algorithms for average case and random
exponent ([45], [33]) and, therefore, it is used by GMP library for modular
exponentiation.
The sliding window Montgomery reduction exponentiation algorithm for
Gaussian integers is denoted as SWG (Sliding Window Gaussian). It is the same
algorithm as the one implemented by GMP, but with real integers replaced with Gaussian
integers modulo prime p : p mod 4 = 3 . The prime p is n bits long. Suppose the window
size is w and the exponent is e : 0 < e < p 2 − 1 . Suppose also that e is such that the number
of multiplications is

2n
(the best case for sliding window algorithm). This assumption is
w

reasonable because mostly random looking exponents are used for cryptographic
applications. In case this assumption is not true, the SWG algorithm would be even
slower compared to Algorithm 2.8.1. Suppose tr ( n) is the running time of one
multiplication of two integers of n bits long and TSWG is the running time of SWG
algorithm (ignoring lower order operations like additions). For each Gaussian integer
multiplication, three real integer multiplications tr (n) and two Montgomery reduction
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operations REDC() have to be performed. For each Gaussian integer square two real
integer multiplications tr (n) and two Montgomery reduction operations REDC() have to
be performed. Each REDC() operation has a cost of β tr (n) . The precomputation required
for the sliding window algorithm could be ignored, it is larger for SWG algorithm, but
becomes less significant as n grows. Thus:

TSWG = 2n ( 2tr ( n ) + 2β tr ( n ) ) +
3 + 2β
⎛
= ⎜ 2 + 2β +
w
⎝

⎞
⎟ 2ntr ( n )
⎠

2n
( 3tr ( n ) + 2β tr ( n ) ) =
w

.

(2.127)

For Algorithm 2.8.1 the same sliding window exponentiation with Montgomery reduction
for real integer exponentiation can be used. Two real integer exponentiations with
exponents less than half the size of e in bits have to be done. To compute Lucas
sequences, the algorithm [74] could be used. The size of the exponent for this algorithm
is approximately one half of the size of e (i.e., n, not 2n) and for each bit one
multiplication, one square and two REDC() operations are required. It can be assumed
that the square takes

2
of the time of multiplication. Suppose TLSEG is the running time
3

of Algorithm 2.8.1, ignoring lower order operations, like additions. As with SWG,
precomputation required for sliding window algorithm could be ignored, noting that it is
smaller for Algorithm 2.8.1. Finally:
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⎛ ⎛2
⎞
⎞ n
TLSEG = 2 ⎜ n ⎜ tr (n) + β tr (n) ⎟ + ( tr (n) + β tr (n) ) ⎟ +
⎠ w
⎝ ⎝3
⎠
⎛2
⎞
+ n ⎜ tr ( n) + β tr ( n) + tr ( n) + β tr ( n) ⎟ =
.
⎝3
⎠

(2.128)

1+ β ⎞
⎛
= 2ntr (n) ⎜ 1.5 + 2β +
⎟
w ⎠
⎝

Thus the improvement based on various window sizes and values of β could be
estimated.

Table 2.7 TLSEG / TSWG Ratio for Various β and Window Sizes

w=1 w=2 w=3 w=4 w=5 w=6 w=7 w=8
β=1

0.61 0.69 0.74 0.76 0.78 0.79 0.80 0.81

β=1.2 0.62 0.70 0.75 0.77 0.79 0.81 0.81 0.82
β=1.4 0.63 0.71 0.76 0.78 0.80 0.82 0.82 0.83
β=1.5 0.64 0.72 0.76 0.79 0.81 0.82 0.83 0.84
β=1.7 0.64 0.73 0.77 0.80 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.84
β=2

0.65 0.74 0.78 0.81 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.85

β=2.2 0.66 0.74 0.79 0.81 0.83 0.84 0.85 0.86
β=2.5 0.67 0.75 0.79 0.82 0.84 0.85 0.86 0.87
β=3

0.68 0.76 0.80 0.83 0.85 0.86 0.87 0.88

β=4

0.69 0.77 0.82 0.84 0.86 0.87 0.88 0.89

As illustrated by Table 2.7, Algorithm 2.8.1 offers an improvement approximately 18%
over SWG for the window size relevant to real world cryptography applications (10004000 bits and window size 7). This translates to about 35% theoretic improvement over
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SWR, but in practice it would be much higher because of low overhead associated with
Algorithm 2.8.1. Moreover, the real time could be significantly improved if (2.123) and
(2.124) are computed in parallel.
It is easy to estimate the real running time improvement ratio of Algorithm 2.8.1
(LSEG) implemented with threads that compute (2.123) and (2.124) in parallel. Such
algorithm shell be denoted as LSEG*. It is easy to see that the computation of (2.123) will
be faster than the computation of (2.124) (real integer exponentiation is faster than Lucas
sequence computation for the same prime). Therefore, the running time of LSEG* as
follows can be estimated as follows:

⎛2
⎞ n
TLSEG* = n ⎜ tr (n) + β tr (n) ⎟ + ( tr (n) + β tr (n) ) +
⎝3
⎠ w
⎛2
⎞
+ n ⎜ t r ( n) + β t r ( n ) + t r ( n) + β t r ( n) ⎟ =
.
⎝3
⎠

(2.129)

1+ β ⎞
⎛
= 2ntr (n) ⎜1.16666 + 1.5β +
⎟
2w ⎠
⎝

Thus the improvement based on various window sizes and values of β can be estimated.
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Table 2.8 TLSEG* / TSWG Ratio for Various β and Window Sizes

w=1 w=2 w=3 w=4 w=5 w=6 w=7 w=8
β=1

0.41 0.49 0.53 0.56 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.60

β=1.2 0.41 0.50 0.54 0.56 0.58 0.59 0.60 0.61
β=1.4 0.42 0.50 0.54 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62
β=1.5 0.42 0.51 0.55 0.57 0.59 0.60 0.61 0.62
β=1.7 0.43 0.51 0.55 0.58 0.60 0.61 0.62 0.63
β=2

0.44 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.63

β=2.2 0.44 0.52 0.56 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
β=2.5 0.44 0.53 0.57 0.59 0.61 0.62 0.63 0.64
β=3

0.45 0.53 0.58 0.60 0.62 0.63 0.64 0.65

β=4

0.46 0.54 0.59 0.61 0.63 0.64 0.65 0.66

As Table 2.8 shows, the multithreaded version of Algorithm 2.8.1 (LSEG*) offers an
improvement approximately 39% over SWG for the window size relevant to real world
cryptography applications (1000-4000 bits and window size 7). This translates to about
52% theoretic improvement over SWR, but in practice it would be much somewhat lower
because of the overhead associated with multithreaded programming. Nevertheless, it is a
great improvement ratio considering this algorithm does not require any special hardware
or software and can be easily implemented.
Most contemporary platforms have multiple processors and/or multiple cores. On
such platforms the parallel implementation of Algorithm 2.8.1 (LSEG*) is more
advantageous because with a relatively small added cost associated with multithreading, a
significant improvement in real running time was achieved. The overhead varies widely
among platforms and implementations but it tends to be relatively small compared to an
added benefit in real running time.
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2.9

Experimental Results

For the experiments the latest release of GMP library 5.0.1 was used. On each platform,
the library was installed and the optimization step performed. The language used was C
compiled it with gcc compiler. The version of gcc did vary across the platforms,
however, it is not important for this study, because only relative running times on the
same platform compiled with the same optimization level were of interest. The sliding
window exponentiation with the Montgomery reduction algorithm for Gaussian integers
with the optimal sliding window size (SWG) was implemented. The optimal sliding
window size was calculated for every exponent.
For real integer exponentiation, mpz_powm function was used that came with
GMP library. It was implemented using the Sliding Window exponentiation algorithm
(algorithm 14.85 in [54]) using Montgomery reduction (section 16.4.2 in [34]). This
algorithm for real integers shall be labeled as SWR (Sliding Window Real). The SWG
was implemented as efficiently as possible; however, it still has more overhead than
GMP’s “mpz_powm” function. Some of this overhead is due to the fact that Gaussian
integer multiplications and squares require extra additions, which was ignored in the
estimates. Some of this overhead is due to the fact that GMP implementations tend to be
very efficient because they use low level platform specific techniques to minimize the
overhead and speedup the calculations. Nevertheless, this implementation of SWG
overtook SWR for bit sizes above 1000 on all platforms and showed the predicted in
previous section 20% speed advantage.
Two versions of Algorithm 2.8.1 were implemented. Both versions used
“mpz_powm” function for real integer exponentiation and the algorithm published in [74]
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for Lucas sequences computations. The first version (LSEG) executed the steps of
Algorithm 2.8.1 sequentially. For small bit sizes (500-2500 bits) it performed better than
predicted, relative to the implementation of SWG. This is due to the fact that it has much
less overhead than SWG, and the estimates in Table 2.5 are biased towards SWG (make
SWG look faster). For really high bit sizes (>4000) the experimental results confirm the
estimates in Table 2.5 (show 15% speedup), but for the bit sizes that are practical for
cryptography the results show improvement of 40-20%, which is much better than
predicted 18%.
The second version of Algorithm 2.8.1 (LSEG*) was implemented using threads
to process real integer exponentiation and Lucas sequences computation in parallel. As
Figure 2.6 demonstrates, the CPU time needed for LSEG* is slightly higher than the CPU
time needed for LSEG. However, the difference is very small. It is due to the overhead
associated with threads. On the other hand, the reduction in real time is very significant
as Figure 2.10 demonstrates. The achieved improvements are in line with the estimates in
Table 2.8. Similar results were achieved on all platforms.
The experiments were performed for bit sizes varying from 100 to 11500 bits. For
each bit size, a random prime p : p mod 4 = 3 of bit size n and prime q of bit size from
2n-1 to 2n were generated. The CPU performance varied widely among the platforms, so
the number of trials N was calibrated for each platform, so one could differentiate
between the performance of the algorithm for lower bit sizes and it would finish in a
reasonable amount of time for high bit sizes. For each bit size the following numbers
were randomly generated:
1) N Gaussian integers ( a, b) : 0 < a, b < p − 1
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2) N exponents e : 0 < e < p 2 − 1
3) N real integers c : 0 < c < q − 1
For each of the N Gaussian integers (a, b)e mod p were computed using SWG, LSEG and
LSEG*. Additionally, for each of the N integers c, c e mod q was computed using SWR.
For each algorithm, the total CPU time was recorded.
The platforms used vary widely in architecture and computing power. Below is
the list of them:
1)

Lenovo T400 Laptop, Intel Core2 Duo CPU T9400 @2.53GHz with 3GB of
RAM, Cygwin under Windows XP OS (32 bit).

2)

AMD Opteron Model 2218 @2.6 GHz Dual core, 8GB of RAM, RHEL Linux
4.2 kernel 2.6.9 (64 bit).

3)

SunOS 5.10, sun4u, Ultra-4, two UltraSPARC-II @ 296MHz processors, 1 GB
of RAM (64 bit)

As expected, the nominal running time varied widely among platforms, but the relative
running times among the algorithms remained consistent. Below are the graphs of the
results from the platform 2). For the sake of brevity the graphs for other platforms
weren’t included, because they are very similar.
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Figure 2.6 The CPU time of SWR,SWG, LSEG and LSEG* for various bit sizes.
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Figure 2.7 The ratio of the running time of SWG algorithm over SWR.
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Figure 2.8 The ratio of the CPU time of Algorithm 2.8.1 (LSEG) over SWG.
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Figure 2.9 The ratio of the running time of Algorithm 2.8.1 algorithm over SWR.
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Figure 2.10 The real running time of SWR, SWG, LSEG and LSEG* for various bit
sizes.
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Figure 2.11 Ratio of real running time of LSEG* over SWG.

The experimental results confirm the estimates from Table 2.5, Table 2.6 , Table 2.7 and
Table 2.8.

2.10 Algorithms for Finding Gaussian Generators

Algorithm 2.2.3 and Algorithm 2.2.4 necessitate a way to find Gaussian integer
generators. A common algorithm based on general cyclic group properties is described
below:

Algorithm 2.10.1 Simple Algorithm for finding Gaussian Generators
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1. Factor p2-1:

p 2 − 1 = ( f1 ) e1 ( f 2 )e2 ...( f k ) ek

(2.130)

2. Select a G=(a,b) such that a > 0 , b > 0 and a 2 ≠ b 2 (mod p )
3. For each factor fi of p2-1, compute

Bi = G

p 2 −1
fi

mod p

(2.131)

If any of Bi=(1,0) mod p then G is not a generator, then go to Step 2. Otherwise,
G is a generator.

Algorithm 2.10.1 is a straightforward extension of the most common algorithm
for finding real integer generators and is based on Lagrange’s Theorem in the
mathematics of group theory. It tests all the divisors of the largest period of a candidate to
determine if it is a generator. Using the theoretical framework presented in Sections 2.3
and 2.5, it was possible to design an improved algorithm to find Gaussian integer
generators for a given prime.

Algorithm 2.10.2 Norm Algorithm for finding Gaussian Generators
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1. Factor

p −1
into k1 factors:
2

p −1
e
= ( f1 )e1 ( f 2 )e2 ...( f k1 ) k1
2

(2.132)

2. Factor 2( p + 1) into k2 factors::

e

2( p + 1) = ( h1 ) e1 ( h2 ) e2 ...( hk2 ) k 2

(2.133)

3. Select a G=(a,b) such that a > 0 , b > 0 and a 2 ≠ b 2 (mod p )
4. r := (a, b)

p +1
4

mod p

5. If r 2 =| (a, b) | mod p go to Step 4.
6. For each factor fi of

p −1
compute
2

bi = ( a, b )

p −1
fi

mod p

(2.134)

If any of b i= 1 mod p then G is not a generator, go to Step 3.
7. (c, d ) = ( r −1 (a, b) ) mod p
2

8. For each factor hi of 2(p+1) compute Lucas sequence values Vhi ( P = 2c, Q = 1) .
If any of Vhi = 2 mod p then G is not a generator, go to Step 3. Otherwise, G is a
generator.
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The relative efficiency of the algorithms would vary somewhat with the type of
exponentiation algorithm used. However, it is clear that Algorithm 2.10.2 is much more
efficient than Algorithm 2.10.1, as shown below.
Algorithm 2.10.1 performs the exponentiation of Gaussian integers. This means
that it is possible to use similar time complexity analysis that was done is Section 2.8 for
the SWG (Sliding Window Gaussian) algorithm. There are differences, however. In the
analysis for TSWG (2.127), it was reasonable to assume that every exponent would be of
average bit size 2n, where n is the bit size of prime p. For Algorithm 2.10.1, on the other
hand, the exponent sizes would be different.
Suppose size(x) stands for the size of integer x in bits (e.g., size(p)=n), then the
sum of sizes of the factors of p2-1 from (2.130) is

k

∑ size ( f ) = size ( p
i =1

i

2

− 1) = 2n

(2.135)

The size of each exponent of fi used in (2.131) is

⎛ p2 −1 ⎞
size ⎜
⎟ = 2n − size ( f i ) .
⎝ fi ⎠

The total number of multiplications and squares performed by Algorithm 2.10.1 is

(2.136)
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3 + 2β ⎞
⎛ k
⎞⎛
TAlgorithm 2.3.1 = ⎜ ∑ ( 2n − size( f i ) ) ⎟ ⎜ 2 + 2 β +
⎟ tr ( n ) =
w ⎠
⎝ i =1
⎠⎝
3 + 2β ⎞
⎛
,
= ( 2kn − 2n ) ⎜ 2 + 2 β +
⎟ tr ( n ) =
w ⎠
⎝
3 + 2β
⎛
= ( k − 1) ⎜ 2 + 2 β +
w
⎝

(2.137)

⎞
⎟ 2ntr ( n )
⎠

where n = size(p), tr ( n) - time to multiply two real integer of size n, k – number of prime
factors of p 2 − 1 as in (2.130), w – sliding window size, and the cost of the modular
reduction is β tr (n) .
The running time complexity analysis for of Algorithm 2.10.2 is similar to the
time complexity analysis of LSEG. As with Algorithm 2.10.1, the size of the exponent is
different. In contrast with Algorithm 2.10.1, Algorithm 2.10.2 factors p 2 − 1 in parts. It
factors

p −1
in Step 2 and 2 ( p + 1) in Step 3. It is worth noting that
2

k1

k2

i =1

i =1

∑ size ( fi ) + ∑ size ( hi ) =
⎛ p −1 ⎞
= size ⎜
⎟ + size ( 2 ( p + 1) ) =
⎝ 2 ⎠

(2.138)

= n + n = size ( p 2 − 1) = 2n

The purpose of this discussion is to show that Algorithm 2.10.2 is faster than Algorithm
2.10.1. Because real integer exponentiation is much faster than Lucas sequences
computation, it is permissible to presume, for simplicity, that real integer exponentiation
has the same time complexity as Lucas sequences computation. Subsequently,
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⎛2
⎞
TAlgorithm 2.3.2 < n ⎜ tr ( n) + tr ( n) + 2 β tr ( n) ⎟ +
⎝3
⎠
k1
⎛
⎞⎛ 2
⎞
+ ⎜ ∑ ( n − size( f i ) ) ⎟ ⎜ tr ( n) + tr ( n) + 2 β tr ( n) ⎟ +
⎠
⎝ i =1
⎠⎝ 3
⎛ k2
⎞⎛ 2
⎞
+ ⎜ ∑ ( n − size( hi ) ) ⎟ ⎜ tr ( n) + tr ( n) + 2 β tr ( n) ⎟ =
⎠
⎝ i =1
⎠⎝ 3
⎛5
⎞
,
= ntr ( n) ⎜ + 2 β ⎟ +
⎝3
⎠
⎛5
⎞
+ n ( k1 − 1) tr ( n) ⎜ + 2 β ⎟ +
⎝3
⎠

(2.139)

⎛5
⎞
+ n ( k 2 − 1) tr ( n) ⎜ + 2 β ⎟ =
⎝3
⎠
⎛5
⎞
= ntr ( n) ⎜ + 2 β ⎟ ( k − 1)
⎝3
⎠

From this inequality, it follows that:

TAlgorithm 2.3.2
TAlgorithm2.3.1

5
+ 2β
3
<
3 + 2β ⎞
⎛
2 ⎜ 2 + 2β +
⎟
w ⎠
⎝

(2.140)

From (2.140) it is clear that Algorithm 2.10.2 is always more than twice as fast as
Algorithm 2.10.1, regardless of w or β (both w and β have to be greater than 0, of
course). In reality though, Algorithm 2.10.2 is even faster, because the real integer
exponentiation is much faster than the Lucas sequences computation for the same prime.
(For simplicity, it was assumed that the real integer exponentiation had the same speed as
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the Lucas sequences computation. This made the estimate for the speed of Algorithm
2.10.2 appear higher.)
To find a real generator for p, p-1 has to be factored. To find a Gaussian
Generator, both p-1 and p+1 have to be factored. One could argue that for large p it may
be too hard to factor p-1 and p+1. Fortunately, for discrete logarithm based algorithms,
very large prime factor of p-1 and p+1 are desired in order to protect against various
attacks. If both p-1 and p+1 have large prime factors (close to the the bitsize of prime p),
then factoring is easy.

2.11 Chapter Summary

In this chapter it was shown that there are no benefits to using non-Blum Gaussian primes
in DLP-based Public Key (PK) cryptography algorithms because there is one-to-one
relationship between Gaussian integers modulo non-Blum Gaussian primes and real
integers. Consequently, the Gaussian integers considered for PK cryptosystems should be
limited to primes P = ( p, 0) , where p is a prime and p mod 4 = 3 . This restriction allows
for efficient implementation of MOD operation used for PK cryptosystems.
In Chapter 2, the properties of the Gaussian integer exponentiation are analyzed
in-depth. Based on these properties, an improved algorithm to find a Gaussian integer
generator is described (Algorithm 2.10.2, Norm Algorithm for finding Gaussian
Generators). The speed of Algorithm 2.10.2 was compared to the speed of Algorithm
2.10.1 (Simple Algorithm for finding Gaussian Generators). It was proven that Algorithm
2.10.2 is always faster than Algorithm 2.10.1. Additionally, it was demonstrated that the
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discrete logarithm for Gaussian integers can be computed by decomposing the Gaussian
integer group into two subgroups and computing the discrete logarithm in each subgroup.
In Section 2.5, it was proven that the Gaussian integer DLP is equivalent to a
combination of the Lucas sequences DLP and the real integer DLP. This fact means that
the Gaussian integer DLP is harder than the real integer DLP, consequently, the PK
cryptosystems based on Gaussian integers exponentiation modulo prime p that is n bits
long is equivalent in security to a real integer PK DLP based cryptosystems modulo
prime q which is 2n bits long.
Finally, based on the proof of the security of the Gaussian integer DLP in Section
2.5, the exponentiation of Gaussian integers modulo prime p were compared to the
exponentiation of real integers modulo prime q, where q is twice the size of p. Firstly, it
was shown (both theoretically and experimentally) that under such settings the
multiplication of Gaussian integers modulo p is about 20% for the bit range currently
used for PK cryptosystems (1500+ bits). Secondly, a novel exponentiation algorithm for
Gaussian integers was introduced in Section 2.8: Algorithm 2.8.1, Lucas sequence
Exponentiation of Gaussian integers (LSEG). It improves the speed by additional 18%
(on top of 20% which results in about 34% over real integer exponentiation). Moreover,
some steps of the LSEG algorithm could be run in parallel (such version of LSEG
algorithm was denoted as LSEG*). LSEG* offers about 52% theoretical improvement
over real integer exponentiation.
Section 2.9 describes the experiments performed on various computing platforms
to validate the theoretical results described in Section 2.8. All the theoretical results were
confirmed experimentally.

CHAPTER 3
EXTENSION OF RABIN CRYPTOSYSTEM INTO THE FIELD OF
GAUSSIAN INTEGERS

3.1

Restriction of Gaussian Integer Domain

To extend the Rabin algorithm, a subset of Z[i], as described in [27], is considered,
namely, real primes p: p mod 4=3 or real Blum primes. This allows for the use of modulo
(mod) operation as defined in Definition 1.3.2. The overhead of this mod operation is
minimal.
The rationale for the restriction of the domain is that the use of Gaussian primes
P = ( a, b) :| P | mod 4 = 1 (or non-Blum Gaussian primes) leads to a less secure and

inefficient algorithm. This point is discussed in-depth in Section 2.1.

3.2

Rabin Cryptosystem

Rabin Cryptosystem was proposed in 1979 by Michael O. Rabin. The high level
description of the algorithm is below:

Algorithm 3.2.1 Original Rabin Cryptosystem
Key generation

Alice selects two distinct primes p and q and calculate n=pq. She publishes n as a
public key.
Encryption
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Given message m: 0 ≤ m ≤ n − 1, Bob computes the ciphertext

c = m 2 mod n .

(3.1)

Decryption

Given ciphertext c Alice computes square roots of c mod n using private keys p
and q. Most of the time there are four square roots of c mod n. Very rarely there
are two square roots of c mod n. Now Alice needs to determine which of the roots
corresponds to the original message.

Rabin Algorithm is sometimes referred to as a version of RSA algorithm. The
security of this cryptosystem is based on the difficulty of the factorization problem.
However, Rabin has many advantages over RSA. The encryption is much faster than
RSA’s, while the decryption speed is comparable with RSA’s. It is proven to be as strong
as factoring. If there are two square roots of c: x and y such that x ≠ n − y , then there are
non-trivial factors of n by computing GCD(x+y,n).
Ironically, this fact is also a major disadvantage of Rabin cryptosystem. It is easy
to factor n if the two square roots of c: x and y such that x ≠ n − y are known. Using one
of Rabin signature schemes or by some other means, Bob can ask Alice to decrypt
ciphertext c and obtain the second root y with a probability ½. This is known as a chosen
ciphertext attack. Another difficulty of Rabin cryptosystem is that Alice needs to figure
out which square root corresponds to the message.
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Both shortcomings of the Rabin can be addressed by adding redundant bits to the
end of every message. One can also use zeros or any preset string of bits. These bits
allow Alice to identify the correct square root. In addition, returning only the root
corresponding to the encrypted message protects against the chosen ciphertext attack.
There is still a possibility that even with redundancy, the Rabin machine would return an
incorrect root. However, if enough redundant bits are used, the probability of this
happening is very small. It is widely suggested that 64 bits is sufficient number of
redundant bits [54]. In this case, the probability of an error is 2-64.

3.3

Square Roots Modulo n=pq

The decryption step requires Alice to take square root modulo n=pq. It is a three steps
process:
1) take square root c mod p. There are two square roots : x1 and x2, where x2=p-x1
2) take square root c mod q. There are two square roots : y1 and y2 where y2=q-y1
3) get four square roots m1,m2,m3,m4 of c (mod n) using Chinese Remainder
Theorem (CRT) on pairs (x1,y1), (x1,y2), (x2,y1) and (x2,y2)

m1 = x1q (q −1 mod p ) + y1 p ( p −1 mod q ) (mod n) .

(3.2)

m2 = x1q (q −1 mod p ) + y2 p ( p −1 mod q ) (mod n) .

(3.3)
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m3 = x2 q (q −1 mod p ) + y1 p ( p −1 mod q ) (mod n) .

(3.4)

m4 = x2 q ( q −1 mod p ) + y2 p ( p −1 mod q ) (mod n) .

(3.5)

q (q-1 mod p) (mod n) and p (p-1 mod q) (mod n) can be precomputed at the time of key
generation.

Another way to compute it is to find a and b satisfying ap + bq = 1, using the
extended GCD algorithm. Then:

m1 = apx1 + bqy1

(mod n) .

(3.6)

m2 = apx1 − bqy1

(mod n) .

(3.7)

m3 = − m1 = n − m1 (mod n) .

(3.8)

m4 = −m2 = n − m2 (mod n) .

(3.9)

If primes p and q are Blum primes ( p mod 4 = 3 and q mod 4 = 3 ), then the square
roots from steps 1) and 2) are easy to compute:

x1 = c

p +1
4

mod p, x2 = p − x1 ,

(3.10)
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y1 = c

p +1
4

mod p, y2 = p − y1 .

(3.11)

For non-Blum primes ( p mod 4 = 1 and q mod 4 = 1 ) it is harder to compute the
square roots. Even though it is possible to use non-Blum primes, it is much more
practical to use Blum primes for the Rabin cryptosystem.

3.4

Extended Square Root Algorithm mod p

To extend the Rabin Cryptosystem to the domain of Gaussian integers, the square root
algorithm was developed. As was already mentioned in Section 2.1, only the subset of
Gaussian primes is considered: real primes p such that p mod 4 = 3 (Blum primes). The
algorithm is below:

Algorithm 3.4.1 Extended Square root algorithm mod p
Given:

H=c+di=(c,d) – Gaussian integer
p

– real Blum prime

Computing: S=(a,b) square root of H mod p

(1)

if (d = 0)

(2)

x:= c(p+1)/4

(mod p);

(3)

if (x2=c)

(mod p)

(4)

return { (x,0), (-x,0) };

// square root of c exists
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(5)

return { (0,x), (0,-x) };

(6)
(7)
(8)

// square root of c doesn’t exist

else

endif
else

(9)

n:=|(c,d)| (p+1)/4 (mod p);

(10)

if (n 2 ≠| (c, d ) |) (mod p)

(11)

return {};

(12)

// square root of |H| doesn’t exist
// no square roots of H exists

else

(13)

t:= 2-1(c+n)

(mod p);

(14)

x:=t (p+1)/4

(mod p);

(15)

if (x2=t)

(mod p) // square root of t exists

(16)

a:=x;

(17)

b:=(2a)-1d

(18)

return {(a,b), (-a,-b)};

(19)

(mod p);

// square root of t doesn’t exist

else

(20)

b:=x;

(21)

a:=(2b)-1d

(22)

return {(a,b), (-a,-b)};

(23)

endif

(24)
(25)

endif
endif

Note that 2-1 mod p is simply

p +1
, since
2

(mod p);
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2

p +1
= p + 1 = 1 (mod p ) .
2

(3.12)

A few simple theorems are needed to prove the validity of the algorithm and show
how it was derived.

Theorem 3.4.1

H has a square root if and only if |H| has a square root (mod p)
Proof:

Suppose G: ord(G)=p2-1 is a generator and H=Gk mod p.
⇒ It is known that H has a square root and the aim is to prove that |H| has a square root.
If H has a square root S and H=Gk mod p then k is divisible by 2. Looking at
| H | mod p :

| H |=| G k |=| G |k mod p .

(3.13)

Since k is divisible by 2, the square root of |H| exists and equals |G|k/2.
⇐ It is known that |H| has a square root and the aim is to prove that H has a square root.
Since the square root of |H| exists, then k is divisible by 2. From this directly follows
that square root of H exists.
Q.E.D.
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Theorem 3.4.2

If H=(c,0) then:
1) H always has a square root S.
2) If a2=c mod p, then (a,0) and (-a,0) are the square roots of H.
3) If c does not have a square root, then (0,b), (0,-b) are the square roots of H, and

b 2 = −c mod p .

(3.14)

| H |=| (c, 0) |= c 2 (mod p) .

(3.15)

Proof:

1) It is true that

This implies that the square root of |H| exists and equals to c. According to
Theorem 3.4.1, square root of H must exist also.
2) It is given than that H=(c,0) and c has a square root. From 1) it follows that
there is a square root S=(a,b) of H mod p.

H=(c,0)=(a2-b2, 2ab) and 2ab=0 (mod p)

(3.16)

From the identity

2ab = 0 mod p

(3.17)
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follows that a or b must be 0. In addition, it is known that c= a2-b2 and c has a
square root.
Suppose a=0 mod p, then c=-b2. From this follows that c does not have a
square root. This is a contradiction because it is known that c has a square
root. Consequently, the only possibility is that b=0 mod p and c=a2 mod p,
thus (a,0) and (-a,0) are the only two square roots of H.
3) It is given that H=(c,0) and c does not have a square root. From 1) it follows
that there is a square root S=(a,b) of H mod p.

H=(c,0)=(a2-b2, 2ab) and 2ab=0 (mod p).

(3.18)

From 2ab = 0 mod p follows that a or b must be 0. In addition, it is
known that c= a2-b2 and c does not have a square root. Suppose b=0 mod p,
then

c=a2 mod p.

(3.19)

Therefore, c has a square root a mod p. This is a contradiction because it is
known that c does not have a square root. Consequently, the only possibility is
that a=0 mod p and c=-b2 mod p. Thus (0,b) and (0,-b) are the only two
square roots of H.
Q.E.D
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Theorem 3.4.3

If H=(c,d), d ≠ 0 mod p and r and –r are square roots of |H| mod p, then:
1) There are exactly two square roots of H mod p: S1=(a,b), S2=(-a,-b).
Neither a, nor b is 0.
2) Either

{a = 2 −1 (c + r ) and b = (2a ) −1 d (mod p )} .

(3.20)

{b = −2−1 (c + r ) and a = (2b) −1 d (mod p )} .

(3.21)

or

Proof:

Since square roots of |H| exist, the square root S1=(a,b) of H mod p exists (Theorem
3.4.1).

S12 = ( a 2 − b 2 , 2ab) = H mod p .

(3.22)

S2=(-a,-b) is also a square root of H because

S 22 = ( − a, −b) 2 = (a 2 − b 2 , 2ab) = H (mod p ) .

(3.23)
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{b = −2 −1 (c + r ) and a = (2b) −1 d (mod p )} .

(3.24)

d = 2ab and d ≠ 0 (mod p)

(3.25)

implies that neither a, nor b is 0. Moreover, | S1 |=| S2 | must also equal to
r = a 2 + b 2 or r = − a 2 − b 2 (mod p). It is known that

a 2 − b 2 = c mod p .

(3.26)

If r = a 2 + b 2 , then

2 −1 (c + r ) = 2 −1 ( a 2 − b 2 + a 2 + b 2 ) = a 2 (mod p ) .

(3.27)

a 2 (mod p) is a or –a. For either a or –a find b using d = 2ab :

b = (2a ) −1 d (mod p) .

(3.28)

If r = − a 2 − b 2 , then

−2−1 (c + r ) = −2 −1 ( a 2 − b 2 − a 2 − b 2 ) = b 2 (mod p ) .

(3.29)
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b 2 (mod p) is b or –b. For either b or –b find a using d = 2ab :

a = (2b) −1 d (mod p) .

(3.30)

Each of the possibilities r = a 2 + b 2 or r = − a 2 − b 2 (mod p) yields two square
roots. Also note that only one of
2−1 (c + r ) and

2−1 (c + r ) or

−2−1 (c + r ) exists because

−2−1 (c + r ) are opposites of each other. Consequently, there are

exactly two square roots of H.
Q.E.D

Note that on lines (17) and (21) of Algorithm 3.4.1 the modular inverse (2a)-1d or
(2b)-1d (mod p) is needed. Before this the condition needs to be checked to make sure
that neither a nor b equals to 0 mod p. Fortunately, this is easy to do. If S is in the form of
(a,0) or (0,b), then H=S2 must be in the form of (c,0). This means that the only condition
needed to be checked is: if d=0 mod p. If d=0 mod p, then Theorem 3.4.2 is applied to
compute the Gaussian square roots of H=(c,0). Only one square root of a real integer is
needed to do it. Lines (1)-(8) of Algorithm 3.4.1 handle to the case when d=0 mod p.
The rest of the algorithm (lines (8) to (25)) corresponds to the more general case
when d ≠ 0 mod p . The square root of |H| mod p is taken on lines (13) and (14).
According to Theorem 3.4.1, the execution can stop if there is no square root of

H mod p ( lines (10) and (12)). Otherwise, it must be true that the Gaussian square roots
of H exist and Theorem 3.4.3 is used to compute them.
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The most computationally expensive operations in Algorithm 3.4.1 are the real
integer square root operations. If H is in the form of (a,0), only one real integer square
root operation is required. Otherwise, two real integer square root operations and one
modular inverse operation are required.

3.5

Extended Square Root Algorithm mod n=pq

The algorithm for finding square roots modulo n= pq can be constructed by using
Algorithm 3.4.1 together with CRT (Chinese Remainder Theorem).

Algorithm 3.5.1 Extended Square root algorithm mod n=pq
Given:

Find:

p, q

- real Blum primes

n=pq

- product of p and q

H=(c,d) mod n

- Gaussian integer

All Si=(ai,bi) : Si2=H (mod n)

Step 1. Find the square root Sp=(ap,bp) of H (mod p) using Algorithm 3.4.1. If Sp does not

exist stop, there is no square root (mod n) for H.
Step 2. Find the square root Sq=(aq,bq) of H (mod q) using Algorithm 3.4.1. If Sq does not

exist then stop, there is no square root (mod n) for H.
Step 3. Reconstruct all different Si using CRT in the following way:

S1=(a1,b1) , where
a1=ap q (q-1 mod p) + aq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.31)
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b1=bp q (q-1 mod p) + bq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.32)

S2=(a2,b2), where
a2=-ap q (q-1 mod p) + aq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.33)

b2=-bp q (q-1 mod p) + bq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.34)

S3=(a3,b3) , where
a3=-ap q (q-1 mod p) - aq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.35)

b3=-bp q (q-1 mod p) - bq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.36)

S4=(a4,b4), where
a4=ap q (q-1 mod p) - aq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.37)

b4=bp q (q-1 mod p) - bq p (p-1 mod q) (mod n).

(3.38)

q (q-1 mod p) (mod n)

(3.39)

p (p-1 mod q) (mod n)

(3.40)

and

can be precomputed.
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There could be at most four distinct Si but it is possible to have one or two distinct
Si. Another way to compute it is to find a and b satisfying
ap + bq = 1,

(3.41)

using the extended GCD algorithm:
S1 = (ap Sp + bq Sq)

(mod n)

(3.42)

S2 = (ap Sp - bq Sq)

(mod n)

(3.43)

S3=- S1

(mod n)

(3.44)

S4= -S2

(mod n).

(3.45)

3.6

Extended Rabin Cryptosystem

Using the extended square root algorithm (Algorithm 3.5.1) the following algorithm can
be formulated:

Algorithm 3.6.1 Extended Rabin Cryptosystem
Key generation

Alice selects two distinct primes p and q and calculates n=pq. She publishes n as
a public key.
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Encryption

Given message M = ( m1 , m2 ) : 0 ≤ m1 , m2 ≤ n − 1 , Bob computes the ciphertext

(

C = ( c1 , c2 ) = M 2 mod n = ( m12 − m22 ) mod n, 2m1m2 mod n

)

(3.46)

and sends C to Alice.
Decryption

Given the ciphertext C Alice computes the square roots of C mod n using private
keys p and q and Algorithm 3.5.1. Most of the time there are four square roots of
C mod n. Very rarely there are two square roots of C mod n. Now Alice needs to
determine which of the roots corresponds to the original message.

To use the original Rabin algorithm Bob would have to break the large messages
into blocks m1,m2,..mL such that 0 ≤ mi ≤ n − 1. With Algorithm 3.6.1, Bob would need to
do the same thing. The only difference is that Bob would send two blocks at the time.

3.7

Security of the Extended Rabin Cryptosystem

It is clear that the Extended Rabin Algorithm (Algorithm 3.6.1) is as secure as the
original Rabin algorithm (Algorithm 3.2.1). If the adversary can compute find two
square roots of C : S1 = (a1 , b1 ) and S2 = (a2 , b2 ) such that S1 ≠ − S2 he/she can find nontrivial factors of n by computing
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gcd ( a1 + a2 , n ) ,

(3.47)

gcd ( b1 + b2 , n ) ,

(3.48)

gcd ( a1 − a2 , n )

(3.49)

gcd ( b1 − b2 , n )

(3.50)

or

a1 − a2 and b1 − b2 here are absolute values.
The Extended Rabin Algorithm, as the original, is vulnerable to a chosen
ciphertext attack. In addition, there is still a problem of selecting the correct square root.
As with the Original Rabin Algorithm, both problems can be addressed by adding preset
bits to the end of every message. With Algorithm 3.6.1 the message M consists of two
blocks m1 and m2. The redundant bits could be added to m1, m2 or both m1 and m2. The
advantage of the Extended Rabin Algorithm is that only half as many bits per block are
needed as with the Original Rabin Algorithm to achieve the same probability of returning
the correct square root. For example, to achieve the probability of an error of 2-64, 32
redundant bits per block are required. With the original 64 bits are required.
When the Rabin algorithm is used with redundant bits, the proof of equivalency to
factoring is no longer valid. This means that Rabin Cryptosystem with redundant bits
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may be easier to break than factoring. If this is the case, then Gaussian integers offer
enhanced security because the order of Gaussian integers mod p is p2-1 as opposed to p-1
with real integers. The order of Gaussian integers mod n=pq is

lcm(p2-1,q2-1),

(3.51)

lcm(p-1,q-1)

(3.52)

as opposed to

with real numbers. Moreover, the fact that there are less redundant bits is also likely to
increase security.

3.8

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, an extension of the Rabin cryptosystem into the field of Gaussian integers
was formulated. The extended cryptosystem employs a new square root algorithm for
Gaussian integers, which is presented in Section 3.4 and proven. The Extended Rabin
cryptosystem is at least as secure as the original Rabin Cryptosystem. When used with
redundant bits, it offers the advantage of using less number of bits.

CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS OF RSA ALGORITHM OVER GAUSSIAN INTEGERS

4.1

Description of RSA Algorithm over the Field of Gaussian Integers

RSA is a widely used algorithm based on the difficulty of factoring a product of two
primes. The original RSA algorithm over the field of real integers is presented below:

Algorithm 4.1.1 Original RSA algorithm
Key Generation: Generate two large distinct real primes p and q. Compute n=pq.

Compute ϕ (n) = ( p − 1)(q − 1) . Select a random integer e such that 1 < e < ϕ ( n) and
gcd(e, ϕ ( n)) = 1 . Compute d := e −1 mod ϕ (n) . The pair n and e is the public key, and d is

the private key.
Encryption: Given a message m (represented as a real integer) compute the ciphertext
c := m e mod n .

Decryption: Compute the original message m := c d mod n .

In [30], RSA was extended into the field of Gaussian integers. It is presented
below:
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Algorithm 4.1.2 RSA algorithm with Gaussian integers
Key Generation: Generate two large Gaussian primes P and Q. Compute N=PQ.

Compute ϕ ( N ) = ϕ ( P )ϕ (Q ) . Select a random integer e such that 1 < e < ϕ ( N ) and
gcd(e, ϕ ( N )) = 1 . Compute d = e −1 mod ϕ ( N ) . Pair N and e is a public key, and d is the

private key.
Encryption: Given a message M (represented as a Gaussian integer) compute cipher text
C = M e MOD N .

Decryption: Compute the original message M = C d MOD N .

4.2

Cryptanalysis of RSA Algorithm over the Field of Gaussian Integers

Algorithm 4.1.2 is the same as in [30]. The notation was converted and a special system
introduced in [30] to avoid negative integers was omitted.
Suppose N=PQ, where P and Q are Gaussian primes. N is a public key known to
everybody. If one can factor N, the cryptosystem is broken and it is possible to read all
the messages. There are three possibilities:
1) P=(p,0) and |Q| mod 4=1 where p is a real Blum prime
2) |P| mod 4=1 and |Q| mod 4=1
3) P=(p,0) and Q=(q,0) where p and q are real Blum primes.

The first possibility is clearly not secure. If P=(p,0) and Q=(a,b) then N=(ap,bp).
To determine the factors of N one needs to find gcd(ap, bp ) = p , where gcd( a, b) = 1 ,
because Q is a Gaussian prime.
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Example 4.2.1 RSA with Gaussian primes of mixed type (small numbers)

P=(23,0), Q=(9,4),
N=PQ=(23,0)(9,4)=(207,92)
gcd(207,92) = 23

Example 4.2.2 RSA with Gaussian primes of mixed type (larger numbers)

P=(2895188484894600915775463803,0), Q=(51325165669337,1615288995535)
N=PQ=(148596028631172174525224275802904110508611,
4676566099649898433587640061946621119605)
gcd(148596028631172174525224275802904110508611,
4676566099649898433587640061946621119605)=
=289518848489460091577546380

It takes a fraction of a second to compute the factor of N in large prime example.
Consequently, this combination of Gaussian primes should never be used in Algorithm
4.1.2.
In case 2), both P=(a,b) and Q=(c,d) are non-Blum Gaussian primes. The one-toone relationship between real primes and non-Blum Gaussian primes could be used. If in
Algorithm 4.1.2 both P and Q are non-Blum Gaussian primes, then, after converting the
Gaussian integers into real integers, the resulting algorithm is the original RSA algorithm
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over real integers. For the examples below the numerical examples from [30] were
considered to illustrate the point.

Example 4.2.3 RSA with non-Blum Gaussian primes

The original example from [30] has the following:
Key generation: Suppose P=(533,162) and Q=(17,10)

(4.1)

N=PQ=(7441,8084).

(4.2)

ϕ ( N ) = (| P | −1)(| Q | −1) = (310333-1)(389-1)=120408816

(4.3)

Select e = 56852657.

(4.4)

d = e −1 mod ϕ ( N ) = 56852657 -1 mod 120408816 = 98072417

(4.5)

The public key is N = (7441,8084); e = 56852657
Encryption:

Suppose a plaintext M = (0,999)
C = M e MOD N = (0,999)56852657 MOD (7441,8084) =
= (-1530,2765)

(4.6)

Decryption:

M = C d MOD N = (−1530, 2765)98072417 = (0,999)

(4.7)

To get the equivalent of real integer RSA protocol the numerical representation of I has
to be computed. If N = a + bi , then a + bi = 0 (mod N ) , where i := −ab −1 mod N . For
this example, N = (7441,8084) or 7441+8084i.
i = (-7441)8084−1 = 120712096*83312011 =
= 90868181 (mod 120719537)

(4.8)
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To get the equivalent real integer RSA protocol the numerical representation of I has to
be computed. If N = a + bi , then a + bi = 0 (mod N ) , where i := −ab −1 mod N .
For this example N=(7441,8084) or 7441+8084i.
i = (-7441)8084−1 = 120712096*83312011 =
= 90868181 (mod 120719537)

(4.9)

The equivalent real integer RSA protocol:
Key generation: Set p = |P| = |(533,162)| = 310333,

(4.10)

q = |Q| = |(17,10)| = 389

(4.11)

n = |N| = |P||Q| = pq = |(7441,8084)| = 120719537.

(4.12)

ϕ (n) = ϕ (| N |) = ϕ ( N ) = (| P | −1)(| Q | −1) = ( p − 1)( q − 1) =
= (310333 -1)(389 -1) = 120408816

(4.13)

Using the same keys e and d:
e = 56852657

(4.14)

d = e −1 mod ϕ ( N ) = 56852657 -1 mod 120408816 = 98072417

(4.15)

Here the public key is n = 120719537; e = 56852657
Encryption:

With the Gaussian integer protocol, the message is M = (0,999) = 999i.
Convert M to m as follows:

m = 999i = 999*90868181 = 116940532 mod 120719537

(4.16)

In the Gaussian integer protocol:

C = M e MOD N =
= (0,999)56852657 MOD (7441,8084) = (-1530, 2765)

(4.17)

There are several ways to get the corresponding c:
1) Convert C to c using the conversion algorithm (Algorithm 2.1.1):
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c = −1530 + 2765i = −1530 + 2765*90868181 =

= 33162438(mod 120719537)

(4.18)

2) Use the integer exponentiation algorithm:

c = me mod n =
= 11694053256852657 = 33162438 (mod 120719537)
Note that 33162438 MOD (7441,8084) = (-1530,2765)

(4.19)
(4.20)

Decryption:

With the Gaussian integer protocol the message is:
M = C d MOD N = (−1530, 2765)98072417 = (0,999)

(4.21)

As with cipher text c, there are several ways to get the corresponding m:
1) Convert M to m using the conversion algorithm (Algorithm 2.1.1):
m = 999i = 999*90868181 = 116940532 (mod 120719537)

(4.22)

2) Use the integer exponentiation algorithm:

m = c d mod n =
= 3316243898072417 = 116940532 (mod 120719537)
Note that 116940532 MOD (7441,8084) = (0,999)

(4.23)
(4.24)

From Example 4.2.3 several facts are clear:
•

If the adversary can break real integer RSA then he/she automatically can
automatically break the corresponding Gaussian integer RSA. Consequently,
when two non-Blum Gaussian primes are used for Algorithm 4.1.2 there is no
added security.

•

Note that the cipher text with Gaussian RSA and the corresponding real integer
RSA has the same number of digits (-1530+2765i vs. 33162438). This is not
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surprising because the one-to-one relationship implies that on average the number
of digits in Gaussian integers and the corresponding real integers would be the
same. The argument that Gaussian integer RSA packs more information is wrong.
In fact, if any of the message representation schemes are used (like redundancy)
the amount of information packed into each message would be less with Gaussian
RSA.
•

There is no need for “domain of validity” concept as described in [30]. The
Gaussian integer modulo operation, if defined carefully, is not ambiguous.
Negative values represent information. In fact, if the “domain of validity” is used,
less information is packed into each message.

It was demonstrated that, if two non-Blum Gaussian primes are used in Algorithm
4.1.2, then there is one-to-one correspondence to real integer RSA. From this, one could
derive a conclusion that the security of Gaussian integer RSA with two non-Blum primes
is the same as with real integer RSA. However, this may not be the correct conclusion. In
fact, it is likely that Gaussian integer RSA is less secure than the corresponding real
integer RSA.
The reason for this is that the problem of representing n=pq (p and q are large
primes) as a sum of two integer squares is a hard problem when factors p and q are large
and unknown. If n can be represented as n = a 2 + b 2 and n = c 2 + d 2 where c ≠ n − a and

c ≠ n − b , then n can be factored easily by doing the following:
1) Multiply a+bi by c+di modulo n
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( a + bi )(c + di ) = e + fi (mod n)

(4.25)

2) Compute gcd(e,f). gcd(e,f) would equal to either p or q.
If representing n as a sum of two squares were an easy problem, then the factoring
of n would be an easy problem also. By using Algorithm 4.1.2 with two non-Blum
Gaussian primes, a partial solution to the factoring problem is given away and, possibly,
the entire solution.
The method described above is a generalization of a method for factorization used
by Fermat. It is based on an idea that, if there are known two integers x and y so that
x 2 ≡ y 2 (mod n) holds, then it can be used for factoring of n=pq. Details of the algorithm
and proof are provided in [32] .
Now the case when Blum Gaussian primes are used in Algorithm 4.1.2 is
discussed. When primes P = (p,0) and Q = (q,0) (p and q are Blum real primes) are used
in Algorithm 4.1.2, it becomes:

Algorithm 4.2.1 RSA algorithm with Gaussian integers and Blum Gaussian primes
Key Generation: Generate two large real primes p and q. Compute n=pq.

Compute ϕ (n) = ( p 2 − 1)(q 2 − 1) . Select a random integer e such that 1 < e < ϕ ( n) and
gcd(e, ϕ ( n)) = 1 . Compute d = e −1 mod ϕ (n) . Pair n and e is a public key, and d is the

private key.
Encryption: Given a message M = (m1 , m2 ) , where 1 ≤ m1 < n and 1 ≤ m2 < n , compute

cipher text C := M e mod n . Here “mod” operation on a Gaussian integer is as follows: if
G=(a,b), then
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G mod n = ( a, b) mod n = ( a mod n, b mod n)

(4.26)

Decryption: Compute the original message M = C d mod n .

This algorithm is described in [28] and it is very similar to real integer RSA.
However, there are differences. In Algorithm 4.2.1, e and d range from 1 to

ϕ (n) = ( p 2 − 1)(q 2 − 1) , as opposed to ϕ (n) = ( p − 1)(q − 1) in Algorithm 4.1.1. The order
of a Gaussian integer modulo n = pq (p and q are Blum real primes) is much larger than
the order of a real integer modulo n. In fact,

ord(G ) mod n ≤ lcm( p 2 − 1, q 2 − 1)

(4.27)

ord( g ) mod n ≤ lcm( p − 1, q − 1)

(4.28)

as opposed to

where G is a Gaussian integer, g is a real integer.
The primes p and q could be selected such that ord(G) mod n would equal to

( p 2 − 1)(q 2 − 1)
24

However, larger order does not necessarily mean greater security for the RSA.

(4.29)
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Currently, RSA is not proven to be as secure as factoring, although many
scientists believe that it is likely the case. If it is the case, then Algorithm 4.2.1 is as
secure as Algorithm 4.1.2. On the other hand, if breaking the RSA is not as hard as
factoring, then it is possible that Gaussian integers add security to the RSA.
At first glance, it seems that the message in Algorithm 4.2.1 packs more
information than the message in Algorithm 4.1.2. However, it is incorrect. Sending one
message with Algorithm 4.2.1 is equivalent to sending two messages with Algorithm
4.1.1 as far as network bandwidth is concerned. Moreover, it takes longer to encrypt a
Gaussian integer message than to encrypt two real integer messages. In Algorithm 4.2.1,
in order to encrypt or decrypt, the following operation has to be performed:

Gk mod n,

(4.30)

where G=(a,b) is a Gaussian integer, and 1 < k < ( p 2 − 1)(q 2 − 1) .
It takes three real integer multiplications and several real integer additions to do
one the Gaussian integer multiplication. It takes two real integer multiplications and
several real integer additions to do one the Gaussian integer square. The integer
multiplication is much more time consuming than the integer addition so the additions
will be ignored in the subsequent analysis.

When using the square-and-multiply

algorithm to perform Gaussian exponentiation, the average running time is

( p 2 − 1)(q 2 − 1)
t1 = 3.5tm log 2
2

(4.31)
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where tm is the time required for multiplication of two real integers.
To encrypt or decrypt a message with the real integer RSA the following operation has to
be performed:

gm mod n ,

(4.32)

where g is a real integer and 1 < m < ( p − 1)( q − 1)
The time required to perform two integer exponentiation operations is:

t2 = 3tm log 2

( p − 1)(q − 1)
2

(4.33)

No additions are necessary for real integer exponentiation operation. Clearly, t1 > t2 . It
takes less time to encrypt or decrypt two real integer messages than one Gaussian integer
message. Consequently, Algorithm 4.2.1 does not have any advantages as far as
encryption or decryption time of a given amount of data is concerned. The example
below demonstrates this point.

Example 4.2.4 Algorithm 4.2.1 vs. Algorithm 4.1.1
Key generation: Suppose p=251, q=263

n = pq = 66013

(4.34)

ϕ (n) = ( p 2 − 1)(q 2 − 1) = (2512 -1)(2632 -1)=4357584000

(4.35)

Choose e = 56852657, then
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d = e −1 mod ϕ ( N ) = 56852657-1 mod 4357584000 = 1716163793

(4.36)

The public key is n = 66013;e = 56852657
Encryption:

Let message M = (m1,m2) = (55555,44444)
C = (c1 , c2 ) = M e mod n = (55555, 44444)56852657 mod 66013 =
= (31754,12046)

(4.37)

Decryption:

M = C d MOD N =
= (31754,12046)1716163793 mod 66013 = (55555, 44444)

(4.38)

The corresponding real integer RSA:
Key generation: p=251, q=263

n = pq = 66013

ϕ ( n) = ( p − 1)( q − 1) = (251-1)(263 -1) = 65500

(4.39)

To get e, reduce e mod ϕ ( n) or mod 65500:
e = 56852657 mod 65500 = 64157

(4.40)

To get d, reduce d mod ϕ ( n) or mod 65500:
d = 1716163793 mod 65500 = 63793

(4.41)

Note that 63793*64157=1 mod 65500
The public key is n = 66013; e = 64157
Encryption:

In the corresponding Gaussian RSA, the message was M=(m1,m2)=(55555,44444)
Encrypt m1 and m2 separately as follows:
c1 = m1e mod n = 5555564157 mod 66013 = 61927

(4.42)
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c2 = m2e mod n = 4444464157 mod 66013 = 22993

(4.43)

Decryption:

Decrypt m1 and m2 separately as follows:
m1 = m1d mod n = 61927 63793 mod 66013 = 55555

(4.44)

m2 = m2d mod n = 2299363793 mod 66013 = 44444

(4.45)

Example 4.2.4 illustrates that Algorithm 4.2.1 and Algorithm 4.1.1 have
approximately the same performance when encrypting and decrypting the same amount
of data. In fact, as was proved before, the original RSA over real integers would be
slightly faster.
The extension of RSA the algorithm into the field of Gaussian integers
(Algorithm 4.2.1) is viable only if real primes p : p mod 4 = 3 are used (Algorithm 4.2.1).
The extended algorithm could add security only if breaking the original RSA is not as
hard as factoring. Even in this case, it is not clear whether the extended algorithm would
increase security. The Gaussian integer RSA is slightly less efficient than the original;
therefore, the original real integer RSA is more practical.

4.3

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, it is shown that the extension of the RSA algorithm into the field of
Gaussian integers is viable only when real primes p: p mod 4 = 3 are used. The extended
algorithm could add security only if breaking original RSA is not as hard as factoring.
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Even in this case, it is not clear if the extended algorithm would increase security. The
Gaussian integer RSA is slightly less efficient than the original; therefore, the original
real integer RSA may be more practical.

CHAPTER 5
A PSEUDO-RANDOM PIXEL REARRANGEMENT ALGORITHM BASED
ON GAUSSIAN INTEGERS FOR IMAGE WATERMARKING

5.1

Algorithm Introduction

Steganography is a process of hiding information in a medium in such a manner that no
one except the anticipated recipient knows of its existence ([61]). The history of
steganography can be traced back to around 440 B.C.E, where the Greek historian
Herodotus described in his writings about two events: one used wax to cover secret
messages, and the other used shaved heads. With the explosion of internet as a carrier for
various digital media, many new directions of this state-of-the-art emerged.
A notable application of steganography is watermarking of digital images, which
is a useful tool for identifying the source, creator, owner, distributor, or authorized
consumer of a document or an image. It has become very easy nowadays to copy or
distribute digital images (whether copyrighted or not). A watermark is a pattern of bits
inserted into a digital media for copyright protection ([12]). There are two kinds of
watermarks: visible and hidden. A good visible watermark must be difficult for an
unauthorized person to remove and can resist falsification. Since it is relatively easy to
embed a pattern or a logo into a host image, the authorized person must make sure the
visible watermark was indeed the one inserted by the author. In contrast, a hidden
watermark is embedded into a host image by some sophisticated algorithm and is
invisible to the naked eye. It could, however, be extracted by a computer.
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There are many innovating watermarking algorithms and many more get
published every day (such as recently published [3, 41, 53, 70] ). In many image
watermarking algorithms, for example in [24, 69, 72, 73], it is required to rearrange the
pixels as a part of watermarking process. Randomness is desired during this step.
Modular arithmetic and, specifically, the integer exponentiation modulo prime
numbers are widely used in modern cryptographic algorithms. One important property of
integer exponentiation modulo prime is that it generates a sequence of integers that looks
very much like a sequence of random numbers. This is a property that is desirable for
pixel rearrangement algorithms. In this dissertation, the rearrangement step of
watermarking algorithms is revisited and a different universal method for doing it is
described. It is easy to replace rearrangement step in [24, 69, 72, 73] with the method
described in this chapter. Moreover, this method can be used with most picture
watermarking algorithms to enhance them.
One can look at Gaussian integers as an extension of real integers into two
dimensions. They exhibit similar properties as regular integers but have some notable
differences, that could be exploited in various fields, such as cryptography [27, 28, 30,
65]. One important difference is that they have a larger order for the same prime size,
which provides the increased security.
In [69, 72], Arnold’s cat map ([10]) was used to rearrange pixels for improving
the performance of watermarking techniques. Here a replacement is described, namely, a
novel pixel rearrangement algorithm based on Gaussian integers, to rearrange pixels in an
image. It is demonstrated that the new algorithm is superior to Arnold’s cat map in both
time complexity and security. This technique is not a watermarking algorithm by itself
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but rather a universal enhancement to any existing watermarking algorithms. The
technique tends to increase robustness to noise by uniformly distributing noise
throughout the image. The increase in robustness depends on the watermarking algorithm
enhanced by the technique.

5.2

Proposed Pixel Rearrangement Algorithm

In this section the algorithms for pixel rearrangement are introduced and their
computational complexity analyzed.

Algorithm 5.2.1 Pixel rearrangement based on Gaussian integers
Given: Image I = (x, y) of size m × n;
Output: Image I ′ = ( x′, y′) of size m × n;

1. Generate a prime p > max( m, n) and p mod 4 = 3 .
2. Find a Gaussian integer generator G = ( a, b) mod p , using Algorithm 2.10.1 or
Algorithm 2.10.2.
3. Generate a random number s, such that 0 < s < p 2 − 1 .
4. S = ( sx , s y ) := G s mod p
5. while ( sx > m or s y > n )
6.

S := SG mod p

7. end-while
8. C = (c1 , c2 ) := S

(5.1)
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9. for i=1 to m
10.

for j=1 to n

11.

I '{c1 , c2 } := I {i, j}

(5.2)

12.

C := CG mod p

(5.3)

13.

while c1 > m or c2 > m
C := CG mod p

14.
15.
16.

(5.4)

end-while
end-for

17. end-for

Note that the last value of C = (c1 , c2 ) needs to be saved in order to rearrange back the
pixels. Without the value of C, pixels could be rearranged back; however, it would
require additional computation.

Algorithm 5.2.2 Reverse of Algorithm 5.2.1

1. Cr := C

(5.5)

2. for i=m downto 1
3.

for j=n downto 1

4.

I {i, j} := I '{c1 , c2 }

(5.6)

5.

Cr := Cr G −1 mod p

(5.7)

6.

while ( c1 > m or c2 > m )
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Cr := Cr G −1 mod p

7.
8.

(5.8)

end-while

9.

end-for

10. end-for

The time complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1 and Algorithm 5.2.2 can be defined in
terms of p. The most computationally expensive operations of the algorithm are (5.1),
(5.7) and (5.8). Suppose that u is the time spent to multiply two integers of size p.
Assuming the square-and-multiply algorithm is used for exponentiation and Algorithm
1.3.1 is used to multiply two Gaussian integers, the time complexity of (5.1) is
approximately:

3.5u log 2 ( p 2 − 1) ≈ 7u log 2 p .

(5.9)

Because the order of Gaussian integers is p 2 − 1 , in Step 4 of Algorithm 5.2.1, p 2 − 1
multiplications are performed. Therefore, the number of multiplications required is:

(

)

Ο 3u ( p 2 − 1) = Ο ( 3up 2 ) .

(5.10)

The total time complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1 is:

(

)

Ο 3u ( p 2 − 1) + 7u log 2 p = Ο ( up 2 )

(5.11)
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The complexity of integer multiplication u depends on the size of p. For small p,
the most efficient algorithm is the naïve multiplication with time complexity of Ο(l 2 ) ,
where l = log 2 p is the size of p in bits. For a larger p, the multiplication algorithm in
[43] is faster than the naïve method. The time complexity of the Karatsuba multiplication
is Ο(3l1.585 ) . For an even larger p, the Toom-Cook (or Toom-3) algorithm is more
efficient with a time complexity of Ο(n1.465 ) [44]. The thresholds for the size of p vary
widely with implementation details. However, it is reasonable to assume that most
images would not be sufficiently large for the Toom-Cook or Karatsuba multiplication.
Therefore, it can be assumed that the naïve multiplication method can be used and (5.11)
becomes:

2
Ο ( up 2 ) = Ο ⎡( p log 2 p ) ⎤ .
⎣
⎦

(5.12)

This is the time complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1. The time complexity for Algorithm 5.2.2
is the same.
To minimize the time complexity, it is reasonable to select p close to max(m, n) . If
p is selected in such a way, then the time complexity in terms of image size is

{

Ο ⎡⎣ max ( m, n ) log 2 ( max ( m, n ) ) ⎤⎦

2

}.

(5.13)

The rearrangement algorithm described above is universal and can be used for
many purposes. It can be applied for image watermarking as follows:
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Algorithm 5.2.3 Watermarking with pixel rearrangement based on Gaussian integers

1. Rearrange the image using Algorithm 5.2.1;
2. Apply the desired watermarking technique to the resulting rearranged image
from Step 1;
3. Apply Algorithm 5.2.2 to the resulting image from Step 2.

Algorithm 5.2.4 Extraction of the watermark applied with Algorithm 5.2.3

1. Rearrange the image using Algorithm 5.2.1.
2. Extract the watermark using the watermarking extraction technique in
Algorithm 5.2.2.

Note that in Algorithm 5.2.2, depending on watermarking technique, it may be
possible to extract watermark and perform rearrangement on the watermark rather than
on the image.

5.3

Cryptoimmunity of the Rearrangement Algorithm

From the properties of Gaussian integer group, it can be estimated how hard it is for an
adversary to obtain the original image from the rearranged one. The less an adversary
knows about the algorithm and parameters, the harder it is to determine the original
arrangement. It is reasonable to look at the following three cases:
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Case 1. The adversary knows nothing about the rearrangement algorithm used, but he/she
suspects that some kind of an algorithm has been used. In this case, it is extremely hard
for an adversary to figure out the original arrangement because there are too many
possibilities. That is, there are n! possible permutations; where n is the number of pixels
in the image.

Case 2. The adversary knows that Algorithm 5.2.1 was used, but he/she does not know
the parameters such as prime p, generator G, or private key s. In this case, the number of
possible permutations for an image I of size m × n is:

(p

2

− 1) ⎡⎣ϕ ( p 2 − 1) ⎤⎦ ,

(5.14)

where ϕ is the Euler’s totient function ([2]).
The formula (5.14) does not include the complexity of guessing p. The reason for
this is that it is too computationally expensive to use a large p (refer to (5.12)). For
efficiency, p should be close to the image size. The prime p in (5.14) can be selected in
such a way that ϕ ( p 2 − 1) is maximized. To do this, one can select a prime with large
prime divisors of p + 1 and p − 1 . For example,

p + 1 = s1q1

and

(5.15)
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p − 1 = s2 q2 ,

(5.16)

where s1 and s2 are small integers, and q1 and q2 are primes close to p in size. In this case:

ϕ ( p 2 − 1) = ϕ ( ( p − 1)( p + 1) ) = ϕ ( s1s2 )(q1 − 1)(q2 −1)

(5.17)

and

(

)

ο ϕ ( p 2 − 1) = ο ( (q1 − 1)(q2 − 1) ) = ο (q1q2 ) = ο ( p 2 )

(5.18)

Consequently, the approximate computational complexity of (5.14) is:

ο

(( p −1) ⎡⎣ϕ ( p −1)⎤⎦ ) = ο ( p ) = ο ( max ( m, n ) )
2

2

4

4

(5.19)

Case 3. The adversary knows Algorithm 5.2.1 used, prime p, and a generator G. In this
case, the number of possible permutations is limited to

p2 −1 .

(5.20)

While it may be unreasonable to assume that the adversary would not know
Algorithm 5.2.1, there is no reason to make a prime p and a generator G known.
Therefore, case 2 may be the most reasonable security estimate.
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If increased protection is desired, Algorithm 5.2.1 could be applied several times
on the same image. Suppose that Algorithm 5.2.1 was applied t times on image I of size
m × n. In this case, the number of possible permutations is:

(

ο max ( m, n )

4t

),

(5.21)

while the time to compute the rearranged image would still be reasonable and be on the
same order in terms of image size:

{

Ο t ⎡⎣ max ( m, n ) log 2 max ( m, n ) ⎤⎦

2

} = Ο {⎡⎣max ( m, n ) log max ( m, n )⎤⎦ } .
2

2

(5.22)

Therefore, one can achieve the desired level of security by increasing the time it takes to
rearrange the image somewhat. Multiple rearrangements could provide a desirable and
practical tradeoff.

5.4

Comparison to Arnold’s Cat Map Chaos Transformation

The Arnold’s cat map transformation variation used in [69] is defined as:

⎡ x′ ⎤ ⎡1 1 ⎤ ⎡ x ⎤
⎢ y′⎥ = ⎢l l + 1⎥ ⎢ y ⎥ mod N ,
⎣ ⎦ ⎣
⎦⎣ ⎦

(5.23)
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where N is the width of the square image. The possible values of l in (5.23) are

l :1 < l < N − 2 . Therefore, the number of the transformations required is O(N). It is
reasonable to assume that N is small enough to call for the naïve multiplication
algorithms. Thus, the multiplication time complexity is

Ο(log 22 N ) ,

(5.24)

and it has to be performed for every pixel (i.e., N2 times). Therefore, the time complexity
of Arnold’s Cat Map is:

Ο( N 3 log 22 N ) .

(5.25)

Formula (5.25) should be compared with (5.13), assuming N ≈ max(m, n) . It is obvious
that the computational complexity of Algorithm 5.2.1 described by (5.13) is much better
than that of Arnold’s Cat map described by (5.25).
As far as security, it is obvious that there are only ο( N ) possible permutations

(

because l :1 < l < N − 2 . It is much smaller than ο max ( m, n )

4

) for Algorithm 5.2.1.

Another important advantage of Algorithm 5.2.1 is that the transformed image
does not have any visible patterns. After rearrangement with this the algorithm, the
resulting image looks like random noise. The transformation with Arnold’s Cat map, on
the other hand, preserves visible patterns. Figure 5.1 clearly illustrates this point. At
every step of Arnold’s Cat map transformation, C1-C7 patterns are clearly visible. The

140

image B, on the other hand, looks like random noise. Consequently, Algorithm 5.2.1,
when used for watermarking, is far superior to Arnold’s Cat map in terms of security and
computational time.
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A

B

C1

C2

C3

C4

C4

C6

C7

Figure 5.1 Image rearranged by Algorithm 5.2.1 and Arnold’s Cat map side-by-side. A
is the original image, B is the rearranged image by Algorithm 5.2.1, and C1-C7 are the
steps of Arnold’s Cat map rearrangement.
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5.5

Example in Image Watermarking

Algorithm 5.2.1 can be used with general watermarking techniques. The following
example illustrates its use of applying LSB substitution for watermark. Even though this
technique does not provide a robust watermark, the use of rearrangement does improve
the security by making the watermark virtually undetectable. When pixel rearrangement
is used and the adversary looks at the last two bits of the watermarked image, all he/she
sees is random noise. The only way to see the watermark is to rearrange the pixels.
Figure 5.2 illustrates the advantages of using the rearrangement algorithm for
image watermarking. In Figure 5.2, (a) is the original Cameraman image, (b) is the two
most significant bits of the Lena image to used as the watermark, (c) is the rearranged
image of Cameraman using Algorithm 5.2.1, (d) is the watermarked image of the
rearranged image using LSB substitution, (e) is the rearranged back of the preceding
watermarked image using Algorithm 5.2.2, (f) is the extracted two bits of LSB, and (g) is
the rearranged back of the preceding extracted image using Algorithm 5.2.2. Note that
image (g) is exactly the same as the original watermark (b).
If the watermarking is performed without rearrangement, then the hidden
watermark is easily detectible. By using the proposed algorithms, it is impossible to see
the original watermark in image (f), which is random noise just like images (c) and (d). It
is fairly difficult for the adversary to extract the original watermark, even though her/she
knows that the watermark is hidden there. With sequential applications of Algorithm
5.2.1, the security could be enhanced to an arbitrary level, making watermark practically
impossible to reconstruct for the adversary.
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(a)

(b)

(c)

(d)

(e)

(f)

(g)

Figure 5.2 (a) The original Cameraman image, (b) the two most significant bits of Lena
as the watermark, (c) the rearranged image of Cameraman using Algorithm 5.2.1, (d) the
watermarked image of the rearranged image using LSB substitution, (e) the rearranged
back of the preceding watermarked image using Algorithm 5.2.2, (f) the extracted two
bits of LSB (g) the rearranged back of the preceding extracted image using Algorithm
5.2.2.
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5.6

Chapter Summary

In this chapter, a new method of rearranging image pixels for watermarking based on the
properties of Gaussian integers is described. It results in a random-looking image
transformation that significantly improves the security of the embedded watermark.
Moreover, it is much faster when compared to Arnold cat map. The proposed algorithm is
an easy-to-implement practical technique that would enhance the security of any
watermarking algorithm. It is flexible enough to offer variable levels of security.

CHAPTER 6
CONCLUSION

The application of Gaussian integers for DLP based public key cryptosystems was
discussed. It was demonstrated that cryptosystems that are based on non-Blum Gaussian
primes (primes P = ( a, b) :| P | is a prime) are equivalent to real integer cryptosystems
modulo | P | (Algorithm 2.1.1 and Algorithm 2.1.2). Therefore, such cryptosystems do
not offer any advantages over real integer cryptosystems. On the other hand, the
cryptosystems based on Blum Gaussian primes (primes P = ( p, 0) : p is a prime) offer a
longer cycle.
It was shown that the Gaussian integer DLP is substantially harder then the real
integer DLP. Moreover, when solving the Gaussian integer DLP, one is required to solve
two problems:
1) Lucas Sequences DLP with Q ≡ 1mod p (Theorem 2.5.2).
2) Real integer DLP.
The fact that these two problems seem to be very different, bodes very well for
cryptography algorithms based on the Gaussian integer DLP. The solution of one
problem may not lead to the solution of the other, so Gaussian integers offer additional
protection.
In addition to allowing for assessing the complexity of the Gaussian integer DLP,
Theorem 2.5.2 is the basis for Algorithm 2.8.1 (Lucas sequence Exponentiation of
Gaussian integers (LSEG)). The LSEG algorithm achieves about 35% theoretical
improvement in CPU time over real integer exponentiation. Under an implementation
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with GMP 5.0.1 library it outperformed the GMP’s "mpz_powm" function (the
particularly efficient modular exponentiation function that comes with GMP library) by
40% for bit sizes 1000-4000, because of low overhead associated with LSEG. Moreover,
some steps of the LSEG algorithm could be run in parallel (such version of the LSEG
algorithm was denoted as LSEG*). LSEG* offers about 50% improvement over real
integer exponentiation.
In this dissertation, the properties of Gaussian integers under modular
multiplication and exponentiation were explored. Specifically, the order of Gaussian
integers and its relationship to their norm was analyzed. Based on the relationship
between the order and the norm, an efficient and practical algorithm to find generators for
the Gaussian integer DLP cryptosystems was designed, namely, Algorithm 2.10.2.
In addition to DLP based cryptosystems, the factoring based cryptosystems with
Gaussian integers were considered (i.e., RSA and Rabin). The Extended Square Root
algorithm for Gaussian integers was derived and its validity proved. Using this algorithm
the Rabin Cryptography algorithm was extended into the field of Gaussian integers. The
resulting Extended Rabin Cryptography algorithm requires only half as many redundant
bits as the original.
The analysis was performed on the extension of RSA into the domain of Gaussian
integers. It yielded several interesting results, namely, that Gaussian primes
P = ( a, b), b ≠ 0 do not offer any immediately tangible advantages over real primes and

that the viability of Gaussian integer RSA is questionable.
Finally, a novel algorithm to rearrange the image pixels for image watermarking
was derived. The new algorithm is much more efficient than Arnold’s Cat map and it
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provides a degree of cryptoimmunity to the watermarks. The proposed method can be
used with most picture watermarking algorithms to enhance them.
The work presented in this dissertation can be extended in many directions
including:
1. Improving the running time of LSEG (Algorithm 2.8.1 )
2. Improving the performance of extended Rabin cryptosystem
3. Improving the security of the pixel rearrangement algorithm (Algorithm
5.2.1)
There are many other ways to extend research, but the abovementioned points seem to be
the most promising.
Any improvement to the LSEG algorithm would mean an improvement in the
running time of the Gaussian integer DLP based cryptosystems. Arguably, there is a lot
of room for improvement. The slowest operation in the algorithm is the computation of
Lucas sequences. Any improvement to the computation time of Lucas sequences would
improve the performance of LSEG. The analysis in this dissertation used the algorithm
published in [74]. It is analogous to square-multiply exponentiation for real integers. The
algorithms published in [18] and [68] improve the running time of [74], however, it can
probably be improved further. Moreover, any improvement to real integer exponentiation
algorithms would improve the performance of LSEG.
The extended Rabin cryptosystem with Gaussian integers is not faster than real
integer for the same amount of data. It is likely that the increase in number of dimensions
in this case could be beneficial i.e., the extended Rabin algorithm with quaternions could
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be faster than the original, provided that the square root for quaternions can be done with
less than four integer exponentiations.
In all probability, the pixel rearrangement algorithm (Algorithm 5.2.1) can be
modified to provide for greater cryptoimmunity with the same or almost the same
efficiency.
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